Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security by Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper & Lobel, Orly
University of San Diego
Digital USD
Law Faculty Works Law Faculty Scholarship
1-19-2016
Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric:
Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
Orly Lobel
University of San Diego School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digital.sandiego.edu/law_fac_works
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty
Works by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Digital USD Citation
Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper and Lobel, Orly, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy with National
Security ( January 19, 2016). Lewis & Clark Law Review, 2016; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 16-207.





Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
 





Economic Espionage as Reality or 








This paper can be downloaded without charge from the 
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract = 2718557   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2718557 
1 
 
Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: 
Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security 









In the last few years, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), a 1996 statute that criminalizes trade 
secrecy misappropriation, was amended twice, once to increase the penalties and once to expand 
the definition of trade secrets and the types of behaviors that are illegal. Recent developments 
also reveal a pattern of expansion in investigation, indictments, and convictions under the EEA 
as well as the devotion of large resources by the FBI and other agencies to warn private industry 
against the global threats of trade secret theft. At the international level, the United States 
government has been advocating enhanced levels of trade secrecy protection in new regional 
trade agreements This article asks about the effects these developments on innovation. The 
article examines the rhetoric the government is using to promote its trade secrecy agenda, 
uncovering that the argument for greater protection appears to derive at least some of its power 
from xenophobia, and most importantly, from a conflation of private economic interests with 
national security concerns, interjecting a new dimension to the moral component of innovation 
policy debates. Analyzing recent empirical research about innovation policy, we ask about the 
effects of these recent trends on university research and on private market innovation, including 
entrepreneurship, information flows and job mobility. We argue that, paradoxically, the effort to 
protect valuable information and retain the United States’ leadership position could disrupt 
information flows, interfere with collaborative efforts, and ultimately undermine the inventive 
capacity of American innovators.  The article offers suggestions for reconciling legitimate 
concerns about national security with the balance intellectual property law traditionally seeks to 
strike between incentivizing innovation and ensuring the vibrancy of the creative environment.  
We conclude that a legal regime aimed at protecting incumbency is not one that can also 
optimally foster innovation. 
 
  




The film begins with footage of an apartment building in flames.  Chinese music plays in the 
background.  The voice-over, in Chinese, transmits urgency. 
 
Soon an impecunious American engineer is approached by a Chinese company keen to produce 
better insulation. At first intrigued by a generous financial offer, the engineer eventually decides 
the Chinese are trying to discover his firm’s secret technology.  He informs his employer; the 
firm tells the FBI.  An investigation ensues: the wrongdoers are caught, tried, and convicted of 
economic espionage.  A hero, the engineer (although still strapped for cash) has saved his firm, 
the jobs of all its employees, and the one-company town in which it is situated.  
 
The film concludes with another voice-over, this one in English: “Trade secrecy theft robs the 
US economy of $400 billion per year” 
 
-- The Company Man: Protecting America’s Secrets (2012)  
 
 
The strong production values suggest MGM, United Artists, perhaps an indie or made-
for-TV movie.  But it is none of the above.  The Company Man, “a cautionary tale” for high tech 
firms, was produced in 2012 by the FBI Counterintelligence Section, Strategic Partnership Unit, 
in collaboration with Rocket Media.1  Much like a Hollywood film, the FBI first tested it, then, 
in July 2015, rolled it out officially during a nationwide economic espionage awareness 
campaign.2  
 
As the production of this film suggests, the United States has become very serious about 
protecting trade secrets.  In the last few years, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), a 1996 
statute that criminalizes trade secrecy misappropriation,3 was amended twice, once to increase 
the penalties4 and then, to ensure that information taken for intended (rather than actual) use is 
sufficient to complete the crime.5  This change also expanded the definition of “trade secret” to 
include information used in “services” not merely “products” involving interstate commerce.6  In 
the first five years, there were only 11 prosecutions under the Act. 7  But as the FBI channeled 
                                                 
1 FBI, The Company Man: Protecting America’s Secrets, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gy_6HwujAtU (July 23, 2015).  See also Dramatic Narrative: The Company 
Man, ROCKET MEDIA (insert correct date) available at http://rocket-media.wix.com/rocket-media#!dramatic-
narrative/c1r1e.  The film itself is on Youtube,  
2 https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2015/july/economic-espionage/economic-espionage; 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/23/fbi-rolls-out-red-scare-film-to-highlight-threat-of-economic-espionage/.  
3 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839 (1996) 
4 Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, H.R. 6029 (2013)(amending § 1831 and 
1832 to increase the maximum penalties). 
5 Id. 
6 Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.112-236, 2012 S. 3642, 126 Stat. 1627 
(2012)(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a))(changing the "that is related to or included in a product that is produced for 
or placed in foreign commerce” to "that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or 
foreign commerce. ..")(emphasis added).  
7 Derek Mason, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, & David A. Oblon, The Economic Espionage Act: Federal Protection for 
Corporate Trade Secrets, The Computer Law., at 14 (March 1999) available at 
http://www.oblon.com/publications/the-economic-espionage-act-federal-protection-for-corporate-trade-secrets/.   
See also Robin L. Kuntz, How Not to Catch A Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American 
Trade Secrets, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 901, 908 (2013) (describing cases prior to 2009 as “unicorn sightings”). 
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more resources into the investigation of trade secrecy cases and other government agencies 
improved their coordination, the number of prosecutions increased.8  As of 2012, there were 
124;9 and in the last two years, prosecutions have increased more than 30 percent over the 2012 
rate.10  The government has also been busy publishing materials on economic espionage.  In 
2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) devoted an entire volume of its U.S. Attorney’s Bulletin 
to issues arising in trade secrecy prosecutions;11 in 2011, the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), which acts as coordinator of government enforcement 
efforts, issued a report focused on the special dangers of cyberespionage;12 in 2012, the U.S. 
Defense Security Service published a major analysis of espionage aimed at U.S. technologies;13 
in 2013, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, 
Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative put out a joint plan on strategies to mitigate trade secrecy theft;14 and in 
2014, the Congressional Research Service published an overview report on EEA-related 
activities.15  In 2015, President Obama issued an executive order to impose new sanctions on 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., The Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, Publ. L. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2393 (Nov. 27, 
2002)(codified at 50 US.C. §401-402) (authorizing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate 
responses to thefts tied to foreign governments); Mark l. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Prosecuting 
Trade Secret and Economic Espionage Act Cases, United States Attorneys’ Bulletin 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/12/10/usab5705.pdf.  
9 Peter J. Toren, A Look at 16 Years of EEA Prosecutions, , Law 360 (Sept. 19, 2012)  available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at-16-years-of-eea-prosecutions According to an administration 
report, from 2009-2013, the FBI was involved in 20 cases—nearly double the total of the first five years. See OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS (2013), 
available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_se
crets.pdf [hereinafter Administration Strategy Report].  It is somewhat difficult to compare cases because the targets 
of EEA investigations can be indicted or convicted on other grounds, such as computer fraud. 
10 Nicole Perlroth, Accused of Spying for China, Until She Wasn’t, NY Times (May 9, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/business/accused-of-spying-for-china-until-she-wasnt.html?_r=0.  
11 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND TRADE SECRETS, 57 (5) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ 
BULLETIN (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/12/10/usab5705.pdf 
(including articles on issues arising in the prosecution of EEA cases, common defenses, parallel proceedings, use of 
electronic evidence, and sentencing); see also Department of Justice, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes 
Manual (4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/03/26/prosecuting_ip_crimes_manual_2013.pdf [hereinafter IP Crimes Manual]. 
12 OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US ECONOMIC SECRETS 
IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, 2009-
2011 (October 2011), available at 
http://www.ncsc.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX 
Report]. 
13 DEFENSE SECURITIES SERVICE, TARGETING U.S. TECHNOLOGIES: A TREND ANALYSIS OF REPORTING FROM 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY (2012), available at http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2012-unclass-trends.pdf [hereinafter 
Targeting Analysis]. 
14 Administration Strategy Report, supra note 9. 
15 Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., R42681, Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of 




cyber-enabled activities, including bans on commercial transactions and freezing U.S. assets.16  
And Congress is now considering a civil trade secrecy law to back up the EEA. 17      
 
The United States has also upped its game at the international level.  The Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) regularly publishes so-called Special 301 Reports 
examining the intellectual property practices of U.S. trading partners and places those deemed 
deficient on watch lists.18  Starting in 2012, these have included strident critiques of countries 
that fail to “have robust systems for protecting trade secrets, including deterrent penalties for 
criminal trade secret theft.”19  Specifically listed are China, India, and Thailand.20  The Reports 
have met with some success—last year, the European Union (EU), which was mentioned in the 
2012 Special 301 Report, promulgated a proposed directive to unify the trade secrecy laws of 
member states.21  Nonetheless, the UTSR has added enhanced levels of trade secrecy protection 
to the agenda for negotiating new regional trade agreements.22  
 
Much of this activity is a dramatic break with the past.  When the EEA was enacted two 
decades ago, the significant change it made in the institutional design of the intellectual property 
system was highly controversial.  While federal law had long provided protection to advances 
that qualify for patents, copyrights, or trademarks, trade secrets were strictly the province of the 
                                                 
16 Exec. Order, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled 
Activities (April 1, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-
blocking-property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m. 
17 See, e.g., S.2267, The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, 113th Cong. 2d Sess. (introduced April 29, 2014). 
18  See 19 U.S.C. § § 2242(d). 
19 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., 2012 Special 301 Report 17 (2012)(citing in particular China, id. at 
26-27 &31). For comparison, the 2011 Special 301 Report made no mention of trade secrets.  Subsequent reports are 
increasingly strident.  The 2014 Report specifically pointing out “inadequacies in trade secret protection in China, 
India, and elsewhere, as well as an increasing incidence of trade secret misappropriation,” 2104 Special 301 Report 
at 6, 16-18 (singling out China,  id. at 31-33;  India, id. at 42, Thailand, id. at 46, and the EU, id. at 11).  The 2015 
Report is similar, see 2015 Special 301 Report, at 1, 20-21.  This time, the Report notes with approval the EU’s 
proposed directive on trade secrets, id. at 21.  However, China is still singled out, id. at 33-34 & 36, as is India, id. at 
51 (Thailand is no longer mentioned in connection with trade secrets). 
20 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., 2104 Special 301 Report at 6 (specifically pointing out 
“inadequacies in trade secret protection in China, India, and elsewhere, as well as an increasing incidence of trade 
secret misappropriation,”); 16-18 & 31-33 (singling out China); id. at 43 ( India); id. at 46 (Thailand).  The 2014 
Report also mentioned the EU, id. at 11.  However, the 2015 Report noted with approval the EU’s proposed 
directive on trade secrets, id. at 21.  China is remains a source of concern, id. at 33-34 & 36, as does India, id. at 51 
(Thailand is no longer mentioned in connection with trade secrets). 
21 See supra note 19; European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
on the protection of undisclosed know how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure 3 COM(2013) 813 final (28 November 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/131128_proposal_en.pdf [hereinafter EU 
Proposed Directive]; ee also Ping, Xiong, China’s Approach to Trade Secrets Protection: Is a Uniform Trade 
Secrets Law in China Needed, in    (Susy Frankel, ed.     2016).   
22 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., 2015 Special 301 Report at 11-12 (noting that the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Intellectual Property Experts Group (IPEG)) has endorsed a U.S. proposal to 
enhance protection for trade secrets); the leaked text of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) includes 
increased protection for trade secrets, including provisions for criminal penalties. See WikiLeaks Release of Secret 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) - Second Release: Intellectual Property Chapter for All 12 Nations with 
Negotiating Positions (May 16 2014), art. QQ.H.8, available at  https://wikileaks.org/tpp/#start;, supra note  9, at 4. 
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states.23  Moreover, there were very few violations of copyright and trademark law that were 
regulated through the criminal law and no criminal penalties attached to any form of patent 
infringement.24  It was especially difficult to understand criminalization of misappropriation at 
the federal level because there were already several federal criminal statutes aimed at deterring 
truly egregious conduct, such as mail, wire, and computer fraud.25  Indeed, a few congressmen 
were so worried about the potential impact of the EEA, that they insisted that for the first five 
years after enactment, the Attorney General’s office approve every prosecution.26 
 
Similar skepticism could be observed in international law.  The World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the WTO’s 
TRIPS Agreement), which was promulgated around the same time as the EEA, includes only one 
provision on trade secrets.27  While TRIPS requires criminal penalties for copyright piracy and 
trademark counterfeiting, it does not mandate criminal punishment for trade secret 
misappropriation.28  To date, no completed bilateral or regional agreement includes any 
reference to the criminal theft of trade secrets. 
 
The gulf between the treatment of trade secrecy and the treatment of copyright and 
trademark violations is not surprising, for the effects of trade secrecy are profoundly ambiguous.  
On the one hand, trade secrecy acts as an incentive to innovate (and a compliment to patent 
protection); it is cheaper, can last longer, and covers advances that are not developed enough or 
sufficiently inventive to qualify for patents.  Trade secrecy also allows innovators to transmit 
technical information to employees, collaborators, investors, fabricators, distributors, regulators, 
and subsidiaries, safe in the knowledge that if secrets leak, there will be legal recourse to recoup 
the lost value and retain exclusivity.   
                                                 
23 Most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990), but a few rely on common law 
and reference the Restatement of Torts, §§757-758 (1939) or the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995). 
In addition, several states provide criminal statutes for theft of trade secrets, for example, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§499c; TEX. PENAL CODE §31.05; N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:20-1; N.Y. PENAL LAW §165.07.    
24 The exceptions are piracy, counterfeiting, and bootlegging. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318 (trafficking in counterfeit 
labels); 2319 (criminal infringement of copyright); 2319A  & B (bootlegging). 
25 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (holding that the conspiracy to trade on employer's 
confidential information is within the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (penalizing theft 
of confidential information by government employees; 18 U.S.C. § § 1961-1968 (RICO, which enhances 
punishment for state offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the computer fraud and abuse act, which punishes unlawfully 
accessing a computer). 
26 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 41 (1998).  Although approval is no longer 
needed to initiate prosecutions of theft for private benefit, prosecutions based on an intent to benefit a foreign 
government must still be approved. See U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual §§1122-23; Doyle, 
supra note 15, at 12 n. 78.  
27 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 81. [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement].   Article 39.1 protects against “unfair competition”; subsection  2  parallels U.S. trade secrecy law and 
requires civil remedies for misappropriating valuable secret information.  Subsection  3  protects data exclusivity: 
information generated to meet market approval of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.  This 
information is undisclosed in only a technical sense (since it is disclosed to the relevant regulatory agency).  
Unauthorized use of such information is beyond the scope of this paper. In contrast, there are multiple provisions on 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.  
28 TRIPS, art. 61 (requiring criminal penalties only for trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a 




But trade secrecy protection can also act as a substitute for patents.  The more it reduces 
the risk of loss, the greater the temptation to rely on trade secrets instead of patents.  Since trade 
secrecy does not require disclosure of the technical details of inventions, over-zealous trade 
secrecy protection can chill innovation, reduce competition, impede entrepreneurship, and 
interfere with the government’s ability to regulate for safety, health, and environmental 
concerns.29  Moreover, as one of us has shown, trade secrecy protection can have a devastating 
effect on employee mobility and depress salaries in the high technology sector.30  Anticipating 
lower salaries, fewer people may be willing to make the very considerable investment in human 
capital necessary to enter high-tech, medical, and scientific fields.   
 
Criminalization further ups the ante.  Thus, Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan Masur 
argue that the benefits of attaching criminal penalties to intellectual property infringements are 
often outweighed by the harm caused by over-deterring legitimate, socially valuable, innovative 
behavior.31 Criminalization can be particularly detrimental in the context of trade secrecy 
protection. The law includes definitions that are rather vague and often circular, which makes it 
difficult to know exactly what behavior is considered illegal; the uncertainty is highly likely to 
lead to over-deterrence and to chill productive exchanges. 
 
Given widespread concerns about over-protecting trade secrets, the heated rhetoric that 
currently surrounds economic espionage demands examination.  Doubtless, technology has 
become an increasingly important asset in our modern economy and the ONCIX Report is surely 
correct that computer hacking is a growing phenomenon.32 However, the government’s 
characterization of the problem too broadly expands the notion of what should be considered 
protectable and what types of activities constitute misappropriation. 33  Through references to 
“Chinese actors [as] the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators”34 and to “the many 
Russian immigrants with advanced technical skills who work for leading US companies,”35 the 
argument for greater protection appears to derive at least some of its power from xenophobia.  
Most importantly, the term “espionage”—and the drama of The Company Man—conflates 
                                                 
29 See Ivan P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from State Trade Secrets Laws (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755284; Ivan P.L. Png, Secrecy and Patents: Evidence from 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617266 
(demonstrating different effects on different industries); Wesley Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh, 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or 
Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552 (2000); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (1999).   
30 Orly Lobel, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 141-52 (Yale University Press 2013); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive 
Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 789 (2015). 
31 Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal 
Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 275, 330 (2014)(patent context). 
32 ONCIX Report, supra note 12 at 1, 6-7 
33 See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (classifying as problematic attending trade shows and collecting information from professional 
journals ). 
34 2014 Special 301 Report, supra note 20 , at 16. 
35 ONCIX Report, supra note 12, at 8. 
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private economic interests with national security concerns, and interjects a new dimension to the 
moral component of innovation policy debates.36    
 
In a prescient article published in 2009, Aaron Burstein considered the impact of using 
innovation laws to protect national security.37  We essentially ask the converse question: the 
effect of classifying trade secrecy as a security issue on innovation.   Part I provides background 
on the EEA.  Part II examines the rhetoric the government is using to promote its trade secrecy 
agenda.  Here we consider whether the FBI is engaging with firms (as, for example, producing 
and disseminating films like The Company Man) so the firms will provide the Agency with leads 
helpful in ferreting out spies, or whether the security trope emanates from the view that it is in 
the nation’s security interests to protect incumbent innovators from foreign (as well as domestic) 
competition.  Part III investigates the ramifications of the latter view on the interpretation of the 
EEA and on the innovation environment.  First, we examine recent patterns of expansion in 
investigation, indictments, and convictions under the EEA.  Second, we ask about the effects of 
these recent trends on university research as well as on private market innovation, including 
entrepreneurship, information flows and job mobility. Paradoxically, the effort to protect 
valuable information and retain the United States’ leadership position could disrupt information 
flows, interfere with collaborative efforts, and ultimately undermine the inventive capacity of 
American innovators.  In Part IV, we offer suggestions for reconciling legitimate concerns about 
national security with the balance intellectual property law traditionally seeks to strike between 
incentivizing innovation and ensuring the vibrancy of the creative environment.  We conclude 
that a legal regime aimed at protecting incumbency is not one that can also optimally foster 
innovation.   
 
I. The Economic Espionage Act  
  
 The EEA was enacted in a period very different from our own.  The Cold War had ended; 
it thus seemed apparent that the espionage profession would collapse as well.  As John le 
Carré—author of the Spy Who Came in From the Cold38—put it, when the Berlin Wall fell, “I 
read my own obituary.39  The master espionage novelist did not, however, fade away.  Instead, 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., id. at 3, (Characterizing the loss of economic information as representing “significant costs to US 
national security.”).  In contrast, civil trade secrecy law is thought to reinforce honest business practices. See also 
Shannon Murphy, How Recent Attempts to Expand Economic Espionage Protection Will Likely Be Futile in Light of 
Trade Secret Protection Schemes Already Available to U.S. Companies, 31 Mich. IT Lawyer 4, 9 (2014)(deploring 
the ethics of imposing new risks on entrepreneurial employees), available at http://www.reising.co/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Pages-from-Michigan-IT-Lawyer-January-2014-Newsletter.pdf.  
37 Aaron J. Burstein, Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic 
Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933 (2009)(noting that the more deterrence is provided through criminalization, the less 
a firm may feel it needs to take action to protect its secrets); See also David Orozco, Amending the Economic 
Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of National Security-Related Technology Thefts, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 877, 
901(2013)(suggesting that the trade secrecy protection should be increased and those who do not reveal knowledge 
of violations should be penalized); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating the 
Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853 (2002) (warning that the EEA 
likely creates a perverse incentive to rely less on patent law while chilling second-generation innovation by 
controlling knowledge).  
38 THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD (Victor Gollancz & Pen 1963). 




he found inspiration in the goings-on of the high technology sector.40  And there was reason to 
think that spy craft would endure in much the same way: that the future would be one in which 
countries competed for economic, rather than military, dominance and espionage agents would 
move on to stealing valuable industrial and technical information.  Concerned, the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and 
Government Information, along with the House Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary 
Committee considered whether the United States had an effective response.41  The EEA was the 
outcome.42 
 
 The statute defines two crimes. Strictly speaking, “economic espionage” refers to the 
first: appropriation of a trade secret without authorization, knowing the offense will benefit a 
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.43  The second, “theft of trade 
secrets,” consists of unauthorized appropriation with “intent to convert [the trade secret] to the 
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner.”44  Apart from the intended beneficiary, the 
two crimes have similar elements: a subject matter requirement (the information must qualify as 
a trade secret), an infringement requirement (the offender must engage in an improper act), and 
intent requirements (an intent to benefit for espionage/to convert for theft; knowledge of 
appropriating a trade secret; and for theft, knowledge that the act would injure the owner).  
Notably, both individuals and organizations can be punished, with higher fines and longer terms 
of imprisonment, for economic espionage benefiting foreign governments than for theft leading 
to private gain.45  In addition, the prosecutor can demand forfeiture, destruction and restitution,46 
as well as injunctive relief.47  Because Congress was specifically concerned with improper 
activity conducted by and for foreign firms and powers, the Act expressly reaches conduct 
outside the United States in three situations: if an individual offender is a citizen or permanent 
resident, if an organization is organized under the laws of the United States or a state, or if an act 
in furtherance of the office was committed in the United States.48 
 
The move to protect trade secrets through federal criminal law troubled intellectual 
property lawyers because it appeared to alter the relationship between trade secrecy law and 
patent law.  Patent law requires disclosure of the details of protected inventions and lasts only for 
a specified term,49 thereby ensuring that the public has the information necessary to build on a 
protected advance, to push the frontiers of knowledge forward, and to enjoy the advance itself 
for free when the period of exclusivity ends.  Public documentation of the metes and bounds of 
                                                 
40 Carré’s next book was THE CONSTANT GARDENER (Hodder & Stoughton 2001), which challenged the way 
pharmaceutical companies tested drugs. 
41 See Dreyfuss, supra note 26 at 5 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 5 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 7 & 14-16 
(1996); see also S. Rep. No. 359, 104th Cong. 2d Sess., at 7 (1996).  As the FBI’s official website once declared, 
“the Cold War is not over, it has merely moved into a new arena: the global marketplace.” See Orly Lobel, 
America's Hypocritical Approach to Economic Espionage, Fortune (September 24, 2013), available at 
http://fortune.com/author/orly-lobel/.   
42 See Kuntz, supra note 7 at 904 (explaining why existing statutes were considered inadequate). 
43 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 
44 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
45 18 U.S.C. §1831(a)(individuals) & (b)(organizations); § 1832(a) & (b) (same). 
46 18 U.S.C. § 1834. 
47 18 U.S.C. §1836. 
48 18 U.S.C. § 1837. 
49 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 & 154. 
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inventions also facilitates transactions and permits employees to take unprotected information 
with them when they change jobs.  In contrast, trade secrecy allows innovators to hide what they 
know from others, including from government regulators, and makes it difficult for employees to 
alter their positions and put their talents to their highest and best use. 
 
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron50 the Supreme Court had upheld a state trade secrecy law 
against a preemption challenge.  Significantly, it did so because the Court assumed the law 
would not take knowledge out of the public domain.51  Further, the justices reasoned that trade 
secrets were so vulnerable to discovery that, “[t]he possibility that an inventor who believes his 
invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law . . . is remote 
indeed.”52   Two important decisions were taken subsequent to Kewanee to make sure the 
Court’s assumptions held true.   First, the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 because Congress 
perceived that patent enforcement had become so weak that inventors were opting instead for 
trade secrecy protection.53   Second, after years of debate, the American Law Institute rebuffed 
an attempt to amend the Uniform Commercial Code to cover intellectual property licensing. 54  
The membership was concerned that improving the enforceability of information contracts 
would lead to more secrecy and undermine national innovation policy.55    
 
The EEA posed a risk of nullifying these actions.  Criminalizing trade secrecy violations 
increased deterrence, which made secrets less vulnerable to discovery.  In addition, it increased 
the stakes for ex-employees and their new employers: both could find themselves subject to fines 
and incarceration if the information used on the new job was deemed to be the previous 
employer’s secret.   
 
To make matters worse, the statute seemingly extended the reach of trade secrecy 
protection quite far—arguably, all the way into the public domain.  First, it included examples of 
                                                 
50 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
51 Id. at 484-485 
52 Id. at 490. 
53 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  See 
Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. O2n Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 574–75 (1980) 
(statement of Sidney A. Diamond, Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks). 
54 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret? How Article 2B Will Make 
Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Difficult), 87 Cal. L. Rev. 191 (1999); Michael Traynor, The 
First Restatements and the Vision of The American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. Ill. U. L. Rev. 145, 148 
(2007). 
55 The ALI Reporter, Article 2B is Withdrawn from UCC and Will be Promulgated by NCCUSL as Separate Act 
(1999), available at http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R2103_Art2b.htm.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: 
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1999)(“Article 2B creates a 
fundamental conflict between the goals of federal and state intellectual property.”); Courtney Lytle Perry, My 
Kingdom for A Horse: Reining in Runaway Legislation from Software to Spam, 11 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 523, 535 
(2005)(speaking of “licensing away the public domain”).  See also id. at 548. That effort was later transformed by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) into the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act, but it too met with considerable resistance and was adopted by only two states. Md. 
Code Ann., Com. Law § 22-101 (LexisNexis 2005); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-501.1 (2013).  A few states even enacted 
anti-UCITA provisions that made unenforceable agreements that chose the law of UCITA states, see Michelle 
Garcia, Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the Clickwrap Conundrum, 36 Campbell L. Rev. 
31, 59 (2013). 
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information that are not mentioned in comparable state laws.56  More important, while the 
subject matter element was cabined by the requirements that the information derive economic 
value from not being generally known and that the employer or company took reasonable 
measures to maintain secrecy,57 the statute failed to define these terms.  Similar concepts in the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the civil trade secrecy law that most states have adopted, 
have received disparate interpretations.58  In some states, trade secrecy owners must exert 
considerable effort and the secret must be absolute.  But “reasonable effort” can mean efforts that 
are inexpensive, which permits even exposed information to be protected in some 
circumstances.59  By the same token, while the UTSA could be interpreted to mean that the 
information is not secret if it is known in business circles, the EEA defined “generally known” to 
mean that the information is known to the general public. Thus, the criminal statute could be 
viewed as more likely to protect industries from new entrants. 60  Moreover, because the statute 
required only an intent to injure and not actual injury, and because it also covered attempts and 
conspiracies, it creates several ways in which taking information that is not actually secret could 
lead to criminal liability.61  Analogously, a violation could occur even if there was no real 
possibility of competitive injury.62 
 
Even more problematic was the possibility that the statute would prevent information 
from ever entering the public domain, either through employees moving to new positions and 
using their training in their new environment,63 or through disclosure.  Like the definition of 
                                                 
56 Section 1839 defines a trade secret to include “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, 
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and 
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in 
writing .”   Under the UTSA, § 1(4), Trade secret “means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process.” 
57 Section 1839(3)(A) & (B); under the UTSA, , the information must “(i) derive[] independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) [be] the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 
58 Unif. Trade Secrets Act (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990). 
59 See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)(lawful fly-over held to 
constitute misappropriation).  See generally, Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of 
Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 46 (Rochelle Dreyfuss and Katherine Strandburg ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2011); IP Crimes 
Manual, supra note 11 at 171-173; see also Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information 
Economy, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1633, 1662 (1998)(noting that state laws were not uniform on these issues). 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2011)(noting that courts have interpreted the 
provision in different ways); IP Crimes Manual, supra note 11 at 165.  See generally Moohr, supra note 37, at 878 
(noting the effect of using the general public as a benchmark).  Cf. TRIPS Agreement, art. 39.2, (which specifies 
that the information is not secret if it is accessible within the circles that normally deal with that sort of information). 
61 See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998)(refusing to permit the defendant to examine whether 
the information was secret because he was charged with the conspiracy and attempt to steal trade secrets); U.S. v. 
Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 544 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an impossibility defense); see also IP Crime Manual, supra note 
11, at 190 (citing several cases).  
62 See, e.g., United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2001)(conviction even though defendant sold to a 
private investigator posing as an agent for a rival firm); IP Crimes manual, supra note 11, at 168. 
63 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (1999)(showing that Silicon Valley prospered 
when employees could easily move from job to job). 
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trade secret, the EEA provided many examples of unauthorized appropriation that are not listed 
in the UTSA.  These included transmitting, communicating, duplicating, and sketching, which 
suggested that even benign activities, like memorization, could be considered actionable.64   
Further, the statute did not specify defenses (apart from certain governmental activity65) or 
define what constitutes a “proper means” of acquisition.66  Thus, it left the status of reverse 
engineering—a crucial important way in which secrecy is lost—unclear.67  Finally, unlike in 
civil actions, where injunctive relief usually lasts only as long as the information is secret or 
would be discovered, 68 the EEA requires only that any injunction issued be “appropriate.”69 
 
Despite these reservations, the EEA went into effect.  However, Congress slowed 
enforcement by requiring that every prosecution during the first five years obtain specific 
approval from the Attorney General’s office.70  Even afterwards, prosecutors proceeded gingerly, 
careful to maintain the long-standing balance between existing state trade secrecy laws and these 
newly enacted federal measures.71  Initially, Government attorneys were instructed to focus on 
specific pieces of information and avoid prosecutions that raised questions about an employee’s 
training or the ability to reverse engineer.72  For example, even though the Justice Department 
concluded that memorization can be an unlawful means of appropriation, it differentiated 
between material committed to memory and “knowledge, skills, or abilities.”73 
 
                                                 
64 Section 1831(a) and (b) consider the following acts actionable if without authorization: 
(1) steals, … appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception …; 
(2) .... copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, 
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys…;   
 (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, 
obtained, or converted … ;   
 (4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or   
 (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) 
through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,   
In contrast, the  UTSA defines “improper means” as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a 
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means,” § 1(1).  See Dreyfuss, supra 
note 26, at 14-15.  The Department of Justice has concluded that memorization is a method of misappropriation, see 
IP Crimes Manual, supra note 11, at 175-176. 
65 18 U.S.C. § 1833. 
66 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). 
67 See Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act-Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public 
Policy, 7 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 147, 169 (2001); James H.A. Pooley et. al., Understanding the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 177, 195 (1997).  Burdens of proof on issues like reverse 
engineering are similarly under-defined, cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., _ F.3d _ 2015 WL 5315388 (9th Cir. 
2015)(addressing the question whether fair use is an affirmative defense or must be disproved by the copyright 
holder). 
68 See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Post-Expiration Patent Injunctions, 7 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 105 (1998). 
69 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a). 
70 See supra note 26. 
71 Private conversation with NY assistant US attorney; IP Crimes Manual, supra note 11, at 161 (noting the 
relevance of civil case law). 
72 Id. at 162.  The Manual does, however, note that for attempts and conspiracies, there is no need to prove the 
information was actually secret. Id. at 164. 
73 Id. at 176 & 191 (citing United States v. Shiah (CaDCt SA CR 06-92 DOC), available at 
http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/cacd/recentpubop.nsf/0/37d207fcb9587a30882573f400620823/$FILE/SACR06-
92DOC.pdf (Where before changing jobs, defendant downloaded 4,700 files but successfully defended on the 
ground this was “part of his “tool kit” of information he had developed during the course of his career.”). 
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As important, the statute as originally drafted included several important limitations.  It 
provided that a trade secret must be “related to or included in a product that is produced for or 
placed in interstate or foreign commerce.”74  Thus, the Act arguably targeted only situations 
where the information was actually embedded in a product and caused real competitive harm.  In 
addition, the scienter elements could act as a limit.  For economic espionage, the statute provided 
that the prosecutor must show the defendant intended or knew the offense would benefit a 
foreign government and knew that it was misappropriating a trade secret.75  On the theft side, the 
requirements were an intent to convert a secret for the economic benefit of another, knowledge 
the act would injure the owner, and knowledge that the defendant was appropriating a trade 
secret.76  Depending on how “trade secret” and “appropriation” were interpreted, these 
requirements potentially had significant bite.77   
 
Kewanee also arguably exerted restraint.  It was part of a series of Supreme Court 
decisions on preemption that were often unclear as to whether the problem was the Supremacy 
Clause78—state interference with federal policy (in which case, Congress was free to make a 
change in the balance between trade secrecy and patenting)—or whether stronger trade secrecy 
protection was inconsistent with the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution.79  Since 
there was authority for the view that Congress could not end-run limits imposed on one 
constitutional power by enacting law under another authority,80 the EEA arguably had to be 
interpreted in ways that avoided interfering with a constitutionally-based balance between trade 
secrecy and patent law.81   Indeed, at the 16-year mark, Peter Toren, former prosecutor in the 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Division of the Justice Department, analyzing all the 
cases that had led to a successful indictment, concluded as follows: 
 
At the time the EEA was enacted in 1996, there was concern raised that the government 
would become involved in the prosecution of not only garden-variety theft of trade secret 
cases, but would prosecute cases that did not even rise to the level of civil trade secret 
violations. 
 
Contrary to this claim, the cases that the government has prosecuted generally involve 
allegations of serious losses to the victims caused by the trade secret thefts. Further, while 
the pace of prosecutions has increased slightly in recent years, the relatively limited 
                                                 
74 George J. Moscarino and Michael R. Shumaker, Changing Times, Changing Crimes: The Criminal's Newest 
Weapon and the U.S.'s Response, 16 Dick. J. Int'l L. 597, 612 (1998)(citing § 1832(a) as it read at the time of 
enactment). 
75 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a). 
76 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
77 See Dreyfuss, supra note 26 at 21-24; Moohr, supra note 37, at 833. 
78 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
79 U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8,cl. 8.  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  Cf. 
Feist Pubs. Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)(expressing shifting views on whether protecting 
facts is preempted by copyright law or the Copyright Clause); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,5 
(1966)(noting that the Copyright Clause is a grant of power and a limitation).  
80 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Railway Executors Assn. v Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982)(preventing Congress from 
avoiding limits in the Bankruptcy clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). See generally Paul J. Heald & Suzanna 
Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause As an Absolute Constraint on 
Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119 (2000). 




number of prosecutions also suggests that the government is being extremely selective in 
the number and type of cases it investigates and prosecutes.82 
  
 
II. The Rhetoric of Protection 
 
  Psychic spies from China  
Try to steal your mind’s elation 
      - Californication, Red Hot Chili Peppers 
 
Against this backdrop, the recent enthusiasm for trade secrecy criminalization is curious.  
Consider The Company Man.  The film depicts how insidiously those intending to steal 
technology operate.  The Chinese government’s goal appeared to be admirable: the viewer is 
initially sympathetic to its desire to protect homes from fire.  Responsive to this concern, a 
company contacts a U.S. firm specializing in insulation.  The first meeting includes a text-book 
negotiation in which the parties discuss the choice between shipping finished product or entering 
into a joint manufacturing venture in China.  Dealings with the engineer are equally familiar: 
would he go to China or work from his home in the United States?  Only slowly do matters go 
awry.  We learn that one of the principals was formerly in the People’s Liberation Army; a 
member of the Chinese negotiating team tries to tap into the U.S. firm’s computer; eventually, 
the engineer realizes he doesn’t really need to work from home; he can earn his “salary” by 
simply disclosing the firm’s technology.  The film, in short, reveals the methods used by those 
who wish to learn American secrets and describes clues a firm should look out for as it enters 
into business relationships with China.  Further, the film identifies the characteristics of 
employees vulnerable to co-opting: the engineer needed money to send his daughter to 
Princeton; he was frustrated by the firm’s failure to promote him. 
 
  But why did the FBI make the film?  There are many crimes—insider trading, 
conspiracies to restrain trade, corruption, blackmail—where associations begin innocently, 
proceed incrementally to illegality, and ultimately inflict significant harm. 83  Thus, it would be 
equally helpful for the FBI to make films that illustrate the early warning signs of other white-
collar crimes.  Yet the government does not usually spend taxpayer money in this way.  Why 
here?  The last frame of the film is suggestive:  “To report suspicious activity, contact your local 
FBI office, or go to https://tips.fbi.gov.”  In other words, not only does the FBI want to help U.S. 
firms protect their technology, it also wants U.S. firms to help the FBI—specifically, the division 
of the FBI that made the film, the Counterintelligence Division, Counterespionage Section.84   
 
 Perhaps, then, one goal of the film is to enlist the private interests of US firms to supply 
the FBI with leads to the location of infiltrators.  Knowing who is present in the United States, 
identifying associates, finding patterns in their communications, learning of foreigners trained in 
                                                 
82 Toren, supra note 9.   
83 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Young, Eager and Indicted, NY Times (June 2, 1986)(describing an SEC investigation of 
insider trading begun over Sabbath dinners). 
84 In the view Bill Evanina, head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, many of the tools used to 
counter economic espionage are the same tools used to target and track terrorists. Wesley Bruer, Sharp Rise in 




computer science and other technical fields is arguably an important way to keep track of 
potential hackers, bomb makers, terrorists, and such.  The government need not follow every tip 
or prosecute every individual to benefit from encouraging the high tech sector to be more 
vigilant about spotting intruders.   Informing firms that it is there to help and reassuring them that 
the FBI will protect their secrets may be critical to coaxing the victims of theft to abandon 
concerns about turning over their cases and information about their critical technology to 
government prosecutors. 
 
 A review of other government materials suggests, however, that the emphasis on 
economic espionage is not meant merely to ferret out terrorists.  Rather, it appears that the 
government’s view of trade secrecy misappropriation has changed.  Economic espionage is no 
longer seen as supplanting military espionage; now, economic espionage is military espionage.  
In a 2000 Congressional hearing of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and 
Trade, talks began with the following statement:  
 
The past decade has brought profound changes, yet some of the characteristics of the old 
world order continue to live on today, with some of the darker impulses of yesteryears 
adapting to fit a new time and a new set of standards and requirements. The front line is 
no longer the one which divides East and West, but the one defined by technological 
innovations. The battle lines lie in research and development. Resources designed and 
previously used exclusively for military intelligence gathering are now being expanded to 
gather intelligence on mergers, investments and other financial transactions. The generals 
are being replaced with CEOs, and the bottom line is not ideological, but financial.85 
  
 The Congressional hearing also included an explanation by the FBI’s Deputy Assistant 
Director for Counterintelligence as to why economic espionage against the United States had 
expanded. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which meant that “[other countries] found 
themselves looking around and saying look, we have got to redefine what is our national 
security. It is no longer aligning ourselves with the Soviet Union or the west. It is we have to 
have a piece of the economic pie.”86  Second, military allies “are now aggressive economic 
competitors” who also want to gain a “piece of the pie.”87  And third,  “rapid globalization of the 
world economy defines national security not so much in how many tanks you have deployed or 
how many soldiers you have on the field necessarily, but instead their strength is measured in 
terms of the nation's economic capability.”88  The speaker concluded his comments with the 
words “national security equals economic security.”89 
 
 A decade later, the equation between military and financial interests is commonplace.  
The 2012 Targeting Analysis begins with the statement that U.S. national security depends on 
thwarting persistent attacks on “U.S. technology, intellectual property, trade secrets, and 
proprietary information.”90  When the 2013 Administration Strategy Report emphasizes foreign 
                                                 
85  Corporate and Industrial Espionage and their Effects on American Competitiveness, House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on International Relations Sept. 13, 2000  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg68684/html/CHRG-106hhrg68684.htm.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 Targeting Analysis, supra note 13, at 5. 
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competitors “with ties to foreign governments,” it refers to perpetrators as “spies.”91  It notes that 
one focus of FBI’s outreach is defense contractors and features the important role played by the 
Department of Defense.92  The Report also highlights six cases, all involving key geopolitical 
adversaries: in five, the perpetrator is Chinese; in the other, a Russian.93  Further, it includes an 
annex summarizing the 20 cases pursued from January 2009-January 2013.  All but three involve 
secrets intended for use in China.94    
 
 Interestingly, the FBI treats the trade craft involved in misappropriation as equivalent to 
that used in traditional espionage.  Thus, it is not insignificant that the FBI made a companion to 
The Company Man.  Game of Pawns95 tells the story of another slow seduction, this time of an 
American student who is encouraged by China to obtain a position with the CIA.  In other 
materials, the FBI even warns businesses about the classic “honey pot” stratagem; advising firms 
that Asian woman are often bait for innocent white American men who can’t hold their liquor.  
Once intoxicated, these men can easily be taken to hotel rooms where they can be seduced into 
revealing sensitive information and their computers can be hacked.  In one trade secret summit in 
California, an FBI special agent advised companies and inside counsel against sending men 
susceptible to the honey pot on business travel to China.  Instead, the agent suggested that when 
possible, it is advisable to send women rather than men to meetings in China because women are 
less likely to be tempted.96  
 
In one way, this is unexceptional.  Hacking, after all, is a form of physical attack 
(“cyberwarfare”) as it can sabotage important infrastructure such as power grids, air traffic 
control, and financial institutions.97  Moreover, many of the technologies susceptible to theft are 
important in combat.  Insulation, for example, while useful in preventing residential fires of the 
type depicted in the first scene of the film, is also matériel: equipment used to protect the military 
                                                 
91 Administration Strategy Report, supra note 9, at 1 & note 1. 
92 Id. at 9. 
93 Id. at 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12.  The Report mentions no domestic cases.  Annex B to the Report lists 20 cases prosecuted 
from January 2009 to January 2013, one involves South Korea, one an India, one Israel;; the rest are about secrets 
intended for use in China. 
94 Id. at Annex B.  The other three involve South Korea, India, and Israel: the rest are about secrets intended for use 
in China.  Toren’s analysis of the 124 cases brought before September 2012 show that the overwhelming majority 
involved China. The rest involved India, the Dominican Republic, South Korea, South Africa, Israel, and Japan, see 
Toren, supra note 9. 
95 The Game of Pawns, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8xlUNK4JHQ.  See Rocket Media, http://rocket-
media.wix.com/rocket-media#!government/cg03.     
96 2014 Trade Secret Summit, AIPLA, Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/TSLS/Pages/Trade%20Secret%20Law%20Summit.aspx. This is, of course, a 
well-known technique for real espionage, see, e.g., James P. Welsh, Behind Closed Doors: Sex, Love, and 
Espionage: The Honeypot Phenomenon (2012), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/2577766/Behind_Closed_Doors_Sex_Love_and_Espionage_The_Honeypot_Phenomeno
n (describing its use by the KGB, the Stasi, North Korea, and China); Phillip Knightley, The History of the Honey 
Trap, Foreign Policy (March 12, 2010), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/12/the-history-of-the-honey-
trap/.   See also Ray Semko, China #1 Country for “Sexpionage”, The DICE Man (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.raysemko.com/2011/12/02/china-1-country-for-sexpionage/.   
97 See, e.g., Damian Paletta, When Does a Hack Become an Act of War?, Wall Street Journal (June 13, 2015), 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/when-does-a-hack-become-an-act-of-war-1434189601;  David E. Sanger, 
In Cyberspace, New Cold War, N.Y. Times (Feb. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/world/asia/us-confronts-cyber-cold-war-with-china.html.   
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during attacks and in battle.  Thus, the ONCIX Report lists, as targets of foreign interest, military 
technologies and “dual-use technologies” (commercial technologies, like insulation, that also 
have military uses).98  It specifically points out the persistent, extensive, and sophisticated efforts 
of intelligence services in China and Russia.99  The Administration Strategy Report highlights a 
case where a Motorola software engineer was intercepted while on her way to China, where she 
planned to turn over mobile telecommunications technology to the Chinese Army.100  In this 
sense, the effort to curb theft is part of a larger program, one that also includes export control 
regulations, which were similarly adopted during the Cold War to prevent the acquisition of 
sensitive information by foreign powers.101 
 
But increasing the protection of military materials is not all that the national security 
trope appears to signify.  Unlike export control regulations, which attempt to distinguish among 
technologies and accord a level of scrutiny that is proportionate to the significance of the 
technology to military objectives,102 the EEA and its accompanying government reports treat all 
information in the same way.  For example, the ONCIX Report does not stop at dual-use 
technologies; it also discusses information and communications technology (ICT), including 
computerization of manufacturing, clean air technologies, advanced manufacturing technologies 
(such as nanotechnology), pharmaceuticals, agricultural technology, and information about 
business deals.103  These are described not in terms of their military use, but rather in regard to 
their civilian applications.104  Thus, they are of interest because the areas are “expected to 
experience surges in investment,” are among the “fastest growing investment sectors,” or will 
“boost industrial competitiveness.”105  According to the Report, healthcare services and medical 
devices are a focus because they represent “two of the five fastest growing international 
investment sectors.”106  Indeed, it is difficult to see how information about business deals has 
any value other than for commercial use. 
 
Nor is the government interested only in standard forms of theft.  The ONCIX Report, for 
example, contains a broad list of activities the United States considers “methods of economic 
espionage.”107  It includes engagement at conferences, conventions and trade shows; entering 
into joint research projects; and exploitation of open source information, such as “information [] 
available in professional journals, social networking and other public websites, and the 
media.”108  Academia, where cutting edge information is routinely exchanged, is a particular 
locus of concern.  The Targeting Analysis discusses, as methods used to collect information, 
                                                 
98 ONCIX Report, supra note 12, at 8. 
99 Id. at 5. 
100 Administration Strategy Report, supra note 9, at 10. 
101 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012).   See generally, David R. Fitzgerald, Leaving the Back Door Open: How Export 
Control Reform's Deregulation May Harm America's Security, 15 N.C.J.L. & Tech. On. 65, 68-71 (2014).  See 
generally Burstein, supra note 37, at 952-959  (describing classification, export controls, and  controls on the 
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“academic solicitations,” including requests to join scientific review boards, requests to study or 
consult with faculty members, or to be admitted to academic institutions.109  Two of the six 
examples highlighted in the Administration Strategic Report involve research for university 
use.110  The ONCIX Report describes academic institutions as a target of espionage and a focus 
of FBI awareness programs,111 and includes a claim that Chinese students take home secret 
scientific information from the universities where they study.112  Moreover, the Report uses the 
yearly expenditures of the National Science Foundation (NSF) as one measure of the value of 
information the government regards as “most vulnerable to economic espionage”113—even 
though the NSF awards much of that funding to basic scientific research, with the intent that 
grantees publish their results.114  
 
The Company Man is thus a piece of a larger strategy to inform the private sector about 
“the number and identity of foreign governments involved in trade secret misappropriation” and 
the methods used in the espionage activity.115  Indeed, the FBI has already used it in over 1,300 
briefings with various industry leaders to demonstrate the global threat of economic espionage 
and the infamous “blundering Chinese executives” hungry for American trade secrets.116 As 
another part of this effort, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and International Trade 
Administration “utilize current ‘road show’ trainings to provide forums to educate the private 
sector, particularly small and medium sized businesses, regarding the economic implications of 
corporate and state sponsored trade secret theft.”117  The FBI is rather creative in its educational 
efforts.  Beyond film, the FBI website includes interviews and podcasts meant to educate 
businesses about contemporary threats.  In one such podcast, an FBI agent is interviewed about 
the first economic espionage trial in U.S. history.  Special Agent Moberly begins, “The stealing 
of our trade secrets from our companies and giving those secrets to any foreign government 
inflicts billions of dollars of loss to our nation and our economy. That is a national security 
issue.”118 The interviewer then jumps in: “I’m Mollie Halpern of the FBI, and this is Gotcha. The 
2010 case put Chinese-born and U.S. naturalized citizen Dongfan “Greg” Chung behind bars for 
nearly 16 years.”119  
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The focus on China (and to a lesser extent on Russia)—as opposed to close allies also 
well known for theft120—is telling.  In part, it may be that China is the prime perpetrator.  Thus, 
a recent, in-house, FBI study found that, while only half of the 165 private companies involved 
claimed to be victimized, of those that did 95% of the theft involved perpetrators with ties to the 
Chinese government.121  But China is not just “the yellow peril”122 in a political or military 
sense. It is a large, emerging economy, recognized to be developing a major presence in the high 
technology sector.123  It is investing billions of dollars in creating laboratories, training scientists, 
engaging in research and development.124  Patent applications by Chinese inventors are 
soaring.125  Unlike time-honored rivals like France or Germany, the technological potential in 
these countries is unknowable.  The ONCIX report characterizes the problem as follows:  
 
China and Russia will remain aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive US economic 
information and technologies, particularly in cyberspace. Both will almost certainly 
continue to deploy significant resources and a wide array of tactics to acquire this 
information from US sources, motivated by the desire to achieve economic, strategic, and 
military parity with the United States. China will continue to be driven by its  
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longstanding policy of “catching up fast and surpassing” Western powers.126   
 
It is therefore not surprising that the FBI website reaches out to the American public with 
a wealth of information and warnings: 
 
The FBI seeks your help in safeguarding our nation’s secrets! 
Our nation’s secrets are in jeopardy, the same secrets that make your company profitable. 
The FBI estimates billions of U.S. dollars are lost to foreign competitors every year. 
These foreign competitors deliberately target economic intelligence in advanced 
technologies and flourishing U.S. industries. 
Foreign competitors operate under three categories to create an elaborate network of 
spies: 
1 Aggressively target present and former foreign nationals working for US 
companies and research institutions; 
2 Recruit and perform technical operations to include bribery, discreet theft, 
dumpster diving (in search of discarded trade secrets) and wiretapping; and, 
3 Establish seemingly innocent business relationships between foreign companies 
and US industries to gather economic intelligence including proprietary 
information.  In an effort to safeguard our nation’s economic secrets, the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA) was signed into law on October 11, 1996.127 
 
In fact, the FBI Director has designated espionage as the FBI’s number two priority—
second only to terrorism.128  In 2010, the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division created the 
Economic Espionage Unit, a specialized group focused solely on prosecuting cases under the 
Economic Espionage Act and dedicated to countering the economic espionage threat through 
training and outreach materials, participating in conferences, visiting private industry, working 
with the law enforcement and intelligence community on requirement issues, and providing 
classified and unclassified presentations.129  According to the FBI, from fiscal year 2009 to the 
end of 2013, the number of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets cases overseen by the 
unit increased by more than 60 percent and “economic espionage and theft of trade secrets 
represent the largest growth area among the traditional espionage cases overseen by CD’s 
Counterespionage Section.”130  Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division FBI, 
Randall Coleman summed things up in his testimony before the Senate: “By obtaining what it 
needs illegally, China avoids the expense and difficulty of basic research and unique product 
development.”131 
 
Two new Congressional initiatives specifically target China. House Resolution 643, 
entitled Calling for Further Defense Against the People’s Republic of China’s State-sponsored 
Cyber-enabled Theft of Trade Secrets describes the need for aggressively implementing and 
coordinating strategies to mitigate trade secret theft by China.132 It recommends more 
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investigations and prosecutions by the Department of Justice, and asks the FBI and the 
Department of Homeland Security to expand warnings to U.S. companies about the large array 
of tools used by actors originating in the Peoples Republic of China to illicit trade secrets.133 In 
addition the resolution demands that the Department of Defense (DOD) restrict military-to-
military contacts with China.134 Similarly, a new bill, the Chinese Communist Economic 
Espionage Sanctions Act, calls on Congress to condemn the Chinese Communist Party and the 
China government for economic and cyber espionage against the United States.135  The Act 
would deny persons and Chinese entities involved in espionage entry into the United States and 
their assets would be frozen.136   All transactions in property and property interests of a “covered 
Chinese state-owned enterprise” or a person who is a member of the board of directors, an 
executive officer, or a senior official of such enterprise, would be blocked or prohibited if those 
property and property interests are in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
within the possession or control of a U.S. person.137 The act would further make an alien 
ineligible for a visa and for U.S. admission if the alien is a member of the board of directors, an 
executive officer, or a senior official of a covered Chinese state-owned enterprise and the act 
would direct the Secretary of State to revoke the visa or other documentation of any alien who 
would be ineligible to receive the visa or documentation.138  
 
While not as often mentioned as the Chinese, Russians are also the subject of the 
discourse on trade secret theft.  The publicity surrounding the prosecution of Sergey Aleynikov 
is particularly suggestive of the fear that foreigners will destroy the technological dominance of 
the United States.  His case is heavily featured in the Administration Strategic Report, where he 
is described as having transferred “extremely valuable proprietary computer code” used in high-
frequency trading to an external server at the time he left a job at Goldman Sachs to go work for 
a rival.139  He was prosecuted twice; both times, he was convicted and both times, the conviction 
was overturned.  In federal court, the conviction (to which an 8-year sentence was attached) was 
thrown out because the prosecutor had failed to show that the source code was embedded in a 
product used in commerce, as required by the EEA.140  A subsequent prosecution under state law 
ended similarly.  The jury’s conviction for “unlawful use of secret scientific material” was 
overturned because the presiding judge did not believe that Aleynikov’s actions fit the 
requirements of New York law that the material taken be “tangible,” or that he had the intent to 
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appropriate something of value.141  Furthermore, the judge noted that the jury faced “an 
unusually difficult task” applying the law to the facts of the case.142    
 
It is no wonder the jury might have been confused: Aleynikov left with 32 megabytes 
from a platform that consisted of an estimated one gigabyte of code, none of which included 
Goldman’s trading strategies, and some of which was open source and available on the internet.  
Furthermore, the evidence suggested that it was part of a system so archaic, the material held 
little interest to his new employer.143  Nonetheless, the coverage of the case has been pervasive 
and virtually always stresses Aleynikov’s obviously Russian name (as in the Administration 
Strategic Report) and sometimes, his appearance—according to Michael Lewis, “in a lineup of 
people chosen randomly from the streets, he is the guy most likely to be identified as a Russian 
spy.”144  And yet, Aleynikov had immigrated to the United States in 1990, had been in the 
United States for years before joining Goldman, held American citizenship, and was leaving 
Goldman to join another U.S. based company. But as the quotation above shows, the FBI’s view 
is that the risk of espionage stems from “present and former foreign nationals.”145 
 
The message, in short, is that foreign-born scientists are dangerous; that foreign interest 
in U.S. technology is an existential threat.  Government materials warn against diminishing U.S. 
export prospects around the globe and putting American jobs at risk.146  The Administration 
Strategy Report quotes President Obama: “We cannot look back years from now and wonder 
why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy . . . . Congress 
should make sure that no foreign company has an advantage over American manufacturing.”147   
When the Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012 was signed into 
law, increasing the criminal penalties for economic espionage and directing the Sentencing 
Commission to consider increasing offense levels for trade secret crimes, the administration 
explained the passage of the law as “an important step in ensuring that penalties are 
commensurate with the economic harm inflicted on trade secret owners.”148  As the 
Administration Strategy Report puts it: “Trade secret theft . . . undermines national security [] 
and places the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy.”149   
 
In the final analysis, the EEA is no longer merely a tool of innovation policy—a 
technique for protecting short-term exclusivity in order to encourage future investments in 
innovation.  Instead, it is a vital part of an initiative aimed at protecting the United States’ 
current technological dominance.  Hence the government’s preference that the tech sector 
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compartmentalize access to trade secrets, even intimating that U.S. firms should approach 
conferences, conventions, trade shows, and even open publication and students warily, despite 
the potential loss of important information exchanges.150 (This emphasis may also explain why 
the government is using Special 301 actions to pressure other countries to adopt trade secrecy 
laws, making trade secrecy protection a “priority issue” in bilateral and regional agreements, 
entering into cooperative arrangements with foreign governments to enhance investigation, and 
proposing a private federal cause of action for industrial espionage.151)  Notably absent from the 
materials circulated by the United States, is reference to the goal of promoting progress.  The 
EEA was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,152 and it is clear that protecting 
America’s edge in commerce is how it is being applied.  Toren’s analysis makes the point.  He 
shows that as of 2012, of the 124 cases brought, 115 involved theft, not economic espionage 
intended to benefit foreign governments;153 often, the cases that are targeted are ones where the 




 The new rhetoric of trade secrecy has led to statutory changes in the EEA, to looser 
interpretations of its provisions, and significantly increased prosecution.  With more 
investigations and convictions, along with a new view of national security, there is also a new 
risk: that instead of protecting US leadership in science and technology, these developments will 
alter the creative environment in ways that chill progress.  This section discusses these two 
issues. 
 
A. Impact of the New Rhetoric on EEA Prosecutions 
 
 In his article on trade secrecy as an instrument of national security, Aaron Burstein 
argued that the EEA actually has perverse consequences for national security.155  Because 
foreign militaries are not their rivals, private firms do not internalize all of the national security 
benefits that flow from keeping information out of the hands of enemy governments.  Increasing 
deterrence—and knowing the FBI to be on call in case of intrusions—only makes matters worse 
because it gives firms even more reason to skimp on their own security measures.156  Burstein 
suggested ramping up the EEA.157 While he ultimately rejected the idea of making firms 
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criminally liable for losing high tech information or for failing to report breaches of security,158 
he did consider relaxing other elements of the crime.159 
 
 To a certain extent, that is exactly what has happened.  The Attorney General’s approval 
is no longer required for prosecutions for theft (it is for espionage160).  Moreover, the critical 
restriction—that the trade secret be embodied in a product in commerce—disappeared in 2012, 
in response to the Second Circuit’s decision to overturn Aleynikov’s EEA conviction.   Under 
the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act,161 it is not only secrets embedded in products that 
are actionable; secrets embedded in services (such as high-frequency trading services) are too.162  
More important, a prosecutor need only show that a product or service was “intended for use” in 
commerce, not that it actually entered commerce.163  Therefore, mere knowledge of potential 
uses may be sufficient.  For example, DOJ now considers this element met if the prosecution can 
show use in research that will lead to the development of a product or service.164    
 
More generally, the Justice Department’s current view of the scienter requirements leaves 
prosecutors with considerable scope.  Relying on the legislative history, the DOJ now argues that 
the knowledge requirements can be satisfied with a showing that the defendant should have 
known the facts in issue; actual knowledge is not required.165  In the DOJ’s opinion, the 
prosecutor need not show the defendant knew that the sub-elements of what constitutes a trade 
secret were present (e.g. that reasonable measures were taken) or even that the information was a 
trade secret, so long as the defendant knew it was proprietary information.166  Given the ONCIX 
Report’s view of what constitutes a trade secret, that is not a very high barrier.167 Indeed, in the 
employment context it is often not a barrier at all, because many employers, as a matter of 
routine, require employees to sign employment contracts that define almost any and all 
information learned on the job as proprietary.168  While knowledge of committing a listed act is 
still required, these are so mundane, they too do not impose a significant hurdle.  And because 
the ONCIX Report and the Targeting Analysis consider even more activities “methods of 
economic espionage,”169 this element may be watered down even further.   
 
                                                 
158 Id. at 981-82. 
159 Id. at 980-91. 
160 IP Crime Manual, supra note 11 at 184. 
161 Pub. L. No.112-236, 2012 S. 3642, 126 Stat. 1627 (2012)(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)).   
162 Id. 
163 Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.112-236, 2012 S. 3642, 126 Stat. 1627 
(2012)(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)). 
164 IP Crimes manual, supra note 11, at 187-89 (noting also that the post-Aleynikov amendment relaxed the view on 
what constitutes commerce).  
165 IP Crimes Manual, supra note 11, at 176. 
166 Id. 
167 Id., citing United States v. Roberts, No. 3:08-CR-175, 2009, WL 5449224, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2009) 
(holding that “a defendant must know that the information he or she seeks to steal is proprietary, meaning belonging 
to someone else who has an exclusive right to it, but does not have to know that it meets the statutory definition of a 
trade secret”) and 181.  See also Congressional Overview, supra note 15at 5-6 (stressing that the EEEA should not 
be “unnecessarily narrowed”). 
168 Lobel, The New Cognitive Property, supra note 30, at 810. 
169 See note 108, supra. 
24 
 
To prove espionage, the government is required to show intent to benefit a foreign 
government, but prosecutors interpret that broadly as well: the focus is on the defendant’s 
subjective belief, not on whether an actual benefit accrues.170  Moreover, “benefit” can include 
“reputational, strategic, or tactical benefit.”171  Nor must the foreign government own the entirety 
of the entity to be benefited.  For theft, intent to confer an economic benefit is required, as is 
intent to injure the owner of the trade secret.  However, in the government’s view, the latter can 
be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as lying about post-employment plans.172  Further, 
the emphasis is on intent, not actual benefit or injury.  As the 2014 Congressional Overview 
states it: “the element addresses the defendant’s state of mind, not reality. Nothing in the 
statute’s language demands that the government prove actual injury.”173  Indeed, because it is 
now recognized that even knowledge of blind alleys (knowing what not to try) is associated with 
savings,174 DOJ could even relax the requirement that prosecutors concentrate on a specific piece 
of information.175  Of course, courts may not agree with the DOJ’s position on all these issues. 
Still, the threat of prosecution—and in some cases, the aftermath of prosecution176—may well 
deter socially important exchanges.  
 
Nor is it likely that constitutional jurisprudence will continue to ensure that the Act is 
interpreted with sensitivity to access interests.  In Golan v. Holder, 177 the Supreme Court held 
that Congress can remove material from the public domain if it reasonably believes the result 
will promote intellectual progress.  And in United States v. Martignon,178 the Second Circuit 
held that criminal statutes protecting intellectual creations (in that case, unfixed copyrightable 
works) are sufficiently different from the kinds of intellectual property law authorized by the 
Copyright and Patent Clause to avoid the problem of using the Commerce Clause to end-run 
limitations on Congressional authority.179  The result is that even if Toren was right in 2012 
when he found that the government only went after no more than “garden variety” theft, the 
future may well involve more troubling prosecutions.180  The U.S. Attorney’s Manual, which 
stresses the deterrence value of prosecution, is suggestive:  
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The availability of a civil remedy should not be the only factor considered in evaluating the merits of a 
referral because the victim of a trade secret theft almost always has recourse to a civil action. The universal 
application of this factor would thus defeat the Congressional intent in passing the EEA.181 
 
The danger of escalating prosecution is borne out statistically. Since 2013, the 
Administration has begun to pursue more investigations and increase the number of indictments 
for economic espionage.  Compared to the previous year, the number of prosecutions increased 
by over 30% and in 2014, the number again increased by over 33%.182  Over half of the 
economic espionage indictments since 2013 have had a China connection.183  A look at a few of 
the cases demonstrates this trajectory.  Hanjuan Jin, a naturalized American citizen of Chinese 
descent who obtained two graduate degrees from American universities, was convicted of 
misappropriating Motorola’s iDEN technology and sentenced to 48 months in jail.184  Jin was 
caught red-handed with thousands of Motorola documents while using a one-way ticket to fly to 
China, where she planned to work for a Chinese competitor of her former employer.  However, 
the information she had—“push-to-talk” capabilities—was known in the industry.  While iDEN 
was a complete end-to-end system that one witness testified had the fastest push-to-talk 
capability, the technology was arguably already losing its commercial cachet.  Thus, Jin claimed 
she was taking the material with her as a study aid and to refresh her knowledge.185  Nevertheless 
her conviction was affirmed, the Seventh Circuit reasoning: 
 
[W]hat she was studying—what she was refreshing her knowledge of—was iDEN.  In China she would be 
a walking repository of knowledge about iDEN that she could communicate to any company or government 
agency interested in hacking or duplicating iDEN.  Could and would, because it would enhance her career 
prospects; what other motive could she have had for refreshing her knowledge of iDEN? So had she not 
been stopped from boarding the plane to China, she would have succeeded in conferring an economic 
benefit on herself and [her future employer], and quite possibly on the Chinese military as well. The 
government doesn't have to prove that the owner of the secret actually lost money as a result of the theft. 
For remember that the ‘independent economic value’ attributable to the information's remaining secret need 
only be ‘potential,’ as distinct from ‘actual.’”186 
  
 Similarly, Wen Chyu Liu, who worked for Dow Chemical Company from 1965-1992 and 
had security clearance, was convicted taking technology he had helped created for use in a firm 
he started with his wife.187  On appeal, Liu challenged the trial court’s exclusion of an expert 
who would have testified that the material taken was generally known in the industry.  Although 
under a standard trade secrecy analysis, that information would be crucial to the question 
whether unlawful misappropriation had occurred, and the Fifth Circuit actually agreed that the 
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district court had erred in excluding the expert, the appellate court nonetheless held the error was 
harmless and sustained the conviction.188   
  
Some of the prosecutions clearly go overboard in the intense focus on Chinese nationals.  
In a 2014 case, Sherry Chen, a National Weather Service hydrologist who specialized in 
forecasting flood threats was met soon after a visit of her family in China by six FBI agents. 
Chen, born in China and a naturalized American citizen, was accused of using a stolen password 
to download information about the nation’s dams and meeting with a high-ranking Chinese 
official.  She was told she faced 25 years in prison and $1 million in fines.  The case was 
investigated for months—right up until the FBI suddenly dropped it.  In an interview about the 
case, even Peter Toren expressed concern about where the government is going with this type of 
prosecution.  As he put it: “They came across a person of Chinese descent and a little bit of 
evidence that they may have been trying to benefit the Chinese government, but it’s clear there 
was a little bit of Red Scare and racism involved.”189  Similarly, former Justice Department 
espionage and computer-crimes prosecutor Mark Rasch reviewed the Chen case and concluded 
that even though “the government thought they had struck gold with this case… the facts didn’t 
quite meet the law here…If you’re looking everywhere for spies, you will find spies everywhere, 
even where they don’t exist.”190  
In May 2015, following the media coverage of the Chen case, twenty-two members of 
Congress asked the Attorney General to determine whether race played a factor in the handling 
of federal investigation and questioned whether there is a growing practice of targeting federal 
employees based on their national origin.191 In the letter, the representatives raise the concern 
that “federal employees are trained that naturalized citizens are more suspicious and that people 
who speak a foreign language at home are more suspicious.”192  
B. Impact of the New Rhetoric on the Creative Environment 
For innovation, the real question is not how much the EEA criminalizes, but what 
criminalization under a broad view of promoting national security does to the pace of 
technological development.  The national-security view of trade secrecy protection is static—it is 
intended to safeguard the current position of the technology industry in the United States.  In a 
sense, then, it offers strong protection for what is already known.  But intellectual property law, 
upon which the EEA was based, was meant to have a dynamic effect—it was aimed at fostering 
future technological development.  As discussed earlier, early EEA prosecutions tried to 
accommodate this goal and to a large extent, succeeded.  But the government’s shift to a security 
frame makes it necessary to reconsider the statute’s impact.  Based on experience with similarly 
structured security safeguards, we fear that the ramifications for university-based research and 
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high tech employment could be considerable.  Ultimately, the global community must ask 
whether a highly interlocking set of protections against trade secrecy leakage will pose a barrier 
to innovation and undermine social welfare.  
 
a. University research.   Many recent prosecutions under the EEA have involved 
university research.  As noted earlier, the government appears particularly concerned about what 
goes on in the academy—it measures losses by reference to research grants; it considers 
conferences and publications a means for espionage; some of the cases have involved university 
researchers.193  Under a view that equates national security with innovation preeminence, it is not 
surprising that this would be so.  As Vannevar Bush, architect of U.S science policy, put it: 
universities are the “engine of innovation”:194 academia focuses on fundamental science, with 
important spillover benefits for industry, commerce, healthcare, and the military.  Not only does 
the federal government invest heavily in this work,195 it has also turned universities into what 
Liza Vertinsky calls the “guardians of invention,”196 charged with the task of translating the 
science into technology and stewarding it to commercial application.  Through initiatives like the 
Bayh Dole Act,197 which allows universities to hold patent rights in federally-funded research, 
academia has become a custodian of intellectual property rights and its efforts are often 
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measured in terms of the patents and associated know-how that they generate and license out.198  
Universities now spin off start-up companies, enter into research joint ventures with private 
industry, and permit (indeed, encourage) their faculty members to play major roles in private 
research and development entities.199  The sum total of these activities makes universities appear 
to be the equivalent of private industry and the information they generate an appropriate subject 
for trade secret protection under civil and criminal law.  Or to put it another way, if the new goal 
of trade secrecy law is to protect the United States’ dominant position in technology, it is easy to 
perceive universities as a key place to police behavior. 
 
But this view of universities misses much that is important about how it is that they play 
this remarkable role.  To address challenging and complex problems, researchers must work 
collaboratively with those in other disciplines and from other backgrounds.  To succeed, faculty 
must be perceived as good collaborators and mentors; they must publish and present their work 
at conferences, visit with others in their field, and provide space to visitors from other 
universities and industry.200  Increasingly, it is crucial that travel and collaboration occur 
internationally.  Because much of the day-to-day research is performed by students and post-
doctoral fellows—and because the public goal of universities is also education—universities also 
work hard to create an attractive environment conducive to learning and to research.   
 
To be sure, the incentives that propel researchers are partly monetary, and are thus 
compatible with trade secrecy.  However, the classic rewards of academia are satisfying 
curiosity,201 solving the “puzzle of how the world works, enjoying the intrinsic satisfaction of 
research and discovery,202 and obtaining public recognition.203  To accomplish these objectives, 
governance by Mertonian norms is critical, especially the norm of communitarianism—the 
conviction that work must be communicated and shared so that others can verify it (through peer 
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review), build upon it, and determine priority of invention.204   University-generated information 
is thus situated in a complex domain.  It is not exactly public, since it can be subject to 
contractual obligations and intellectual property rights.  But it is not private either.  Michael 
Madison, Brett Frischmann and Katherine Strandburg call it an “information commons”: 
universities are internally and jointly organized to pool knowledge resources, even when 
externally structured to, in some instances, require payment from others.205    
  
Even within universities, the complexity of this terrain is problematic, for proprietary 
goals can conflict with the university’s broader mission to discover, educate, and spread 
knowledge.  To combat the perception that patents and licenses are the sole measure of their 
scientific contributions, MIT conducted a comprehensive study of its activities, which 
demonstrated the outsize role that free technology transfer plays in keeping the nation at the 
technological frontier.206  The University of California has pioneered methods of evaluating 
technology transfer offices that take account of non-proprietary transfers.207  Although 
universities enter into many ventures with private firms, they routinely guard against agreements 
that prohibit publication, require significant delays, or jeopardize the ability of their faculty or 
students to share information.208  The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), 
for example, has promulgated a list of points to consider in university licensing that has been 
signed by many major universities and medical colleges.209  The points include making sure that 
licensing agreements do not restrict university faculty from engaging in future research, 
structuring licenses to encourage technology development, ensuring broad access to research 
tools, and—significantly—taking a cautious approach to enforcing intellectual property rights.210  
 
Universities have been particularly alert to successive attempts by the government to 
interfere with this complex ecology in the name of national security.  In the 1980’s, amid 
concerns about the Soviet Union, Admiral Bobby Inman, at one time Deputy Director of the 
CIA, gave a speech at the American Association for the Advancement of Science raising many 
of the same themes we see today: 
 
[F]oreign intelligence services . . . are collecting all types of information in the U.S. Specific data on 
technical subjects are high on the wanted list of every major foreign intelligence service and for good 
reasons. . . . In terms of harm to the national interests, it makes little difference whether the data are copied 
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from technical journals in a library or given away by a member of our society to an agent of a foreign 
power…211  
To stop the “hemorrhaging,” Inman proposed that the government exert greater control over the 
release of technological information.  But to a large extent, universities successfully resisted his 
proposal.  In 1985, President Reagan promulgated NSDD-189, a national policy on technology 
transfer that protects fundamental research by exempting unclassified information from various 
forms of control.212  Although the policy statement warned about the acquisition of information 
by Eastern Bloc Nations and acknowledged that some research may be classified, it also 
recognized that American leadership required an “environment in which the free exchange of 
ideas is a vital component” and firmly stated that to the “maximum extent possible, the products 
of fundamental research remain unrestricted.”  After the attack on the World Trade Center in 
September 2001, much the same thing happened.  Concerns over information transfer were 
expressed, but the Bush administration ultimately confirmed that NSDD-189 remained in effect.  
Even so, many universities have been concerned.  The National Academies of Science has issued 
a series of recommendations to ensure the NSDD-189 policy is continued.213 
 
Universities have also directly monitored the manner in which export control laws and 
visas are administered.214 These laws have been subject to varying interpretations, leading to 
attempts to exert extraordinary levels of control, including on distribution of fairly common 
laboratory tools, and to consider sharing even certain unclassified information with foreigners 
(even those with green cards) as a deemed export, subject to regulation. Although actions in 
2005-2006 brought some clarity to both export and deemed export regulations,215 and in 2009, 
President Obama launched a comprehensive review aimed at creating a single unified system of 
export review,216 the laws remain a topic of National Academies recommendations and AUTM 
concern.217  Analogous problems have occurred with visas.  After 9/11, the government 
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increased the time necessary to process visas, affecting not only the job market but also 
universities and graduate students.218  That was ended when universities complained about 
interference with scientific collaborations, the flow of scientific talent, and the timing of 
important conferences.219  
 
In light of the success universities have had at protecting their information commonses, 
one might think they will be equally able to thwart heavy handed applications of the EEA.  But 
in many ways, the EEA presents a much more pernicious problem than classification systems, 
export and deemed export controls, and visas because it covers more activities.  Moreover, 
universities are not as well positioned to deal with its impact.  First, the government has long 
recognized that direct controls over information transfers implicate important scientific and 
academic values.  NSDD-189 states as much and, with regard to exports, deemed exports, and 
visas, the government does undertake to maintain consistency with it.220  No similar effort has 
been made regarding the EEA.  Second, one aspect of the accommodation is a complex 
classification system that focuses on the potential military applications of particular 
technologies.221  A frame that equates technological dominance with national security puts the 
focus on the status of the information as proprietary, regardless of its potential application.  
Third, regulations are adopted centrally, by individual agencies or under President Obama’s new 
initiative, by a consortium of regulators.  EEA prosecutions are largely decentralized and, for 
theft, left to the discretion of individual prosecutors, which means there may be little 
consideration given to the cumulative impact of these efforts on the university community. 
 Most important, export, deemed export, and visa regulations directly affect universities 
and university administrators.  Accordingly, slippages in the definition of sensitive information 
or the activities labeled as suspect quickly come to their attention.  As we saw, the National 
Academies, which has a longstanding interest in the problem, acts as a strong advocate for 
university interests in open science, yet it has not commented on the effect of the EEA. The 
reason may be that university administrators have little occasion to review documents like the 
Department of Justice’s IP Crimes Manual.  And because prosecutions generally involve 
transfers of information to foreign universities, administrators do not see indictments either.  
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Indeed, because their  involvement is framed as the victims of crime, there is little occasion 
universities to systematically consider how the EEA affects their roles as centers of fundamental 
research. 
In addition, the FBI seems intent on developing a cozy relationship with the academy and 
appears to a large extent to be successful in these efforts.222  A recent news article titled 
American Universities Infected by Foreign Spies Detected by FBI describes instances of 
universities, consulting with the FBI, refuse funds and students because of the fear they might 
come with hidden foreign agendas to steal information. The article describes a professor at 
University of Colorado who decided to stop accepting visiting scholars from China because one 
such student asked questions that “made him uncomfortable.” The piece also quotes FBI officials 
as warning against attempts to steal trade secrets from universities through “academic 
solicitation,” including “requests to review academic papers or study with professors,” and notes 
that invitations to present papers at international conference or visits at research labs can be a set 
up for predatory espionage, and suggesting that foreign exchange programs are a prime target for 
stealing valuable knowledge.223  
 
Nor are universities in a position to complain about how the statute is interpreted in 
individual cases.  Prosecutions are not targeted at a university, but rather at individual faculty 
members—indeed, at individuals who left the university, often to work at a global rival.  The 
university is thus in the posture of a victim and may not have an interest in helping such 
defendants.  Even if it did, the university would have no formal role in the criminal trial or 
appeal  and thus would lack opportunity to present arguments about whether the information 
taken should be considered a trade secret, whether the defendant’s activities should be though to 
constitute misappropriation, or whether the value of the information was such that the defendant 
could have rationally formulated the intent to benefit a foreign government (for espionage) or 
injure the owner of the information (for theft).224   
 
Because EEA prosecutions are more episodic than export controls, it could be argued that 
their effect is less deleterious.  But that seems unlikely.  The goal of criminal law is deterrence 
and if prosecutions are stepped up as planned, the EEA could be very effective.  Academics may 
not be completely judgment proof, but they are probably relatively insensitive to the prospect of 
civil liability for trade secrecy violations. They are, however, likely to be very concerned by the 
prospect of incarceration.  To compound the problem, ownership to collaborative projects can be 
murky in academic settings.225  There are few civil cases because faculty and students have 
reputational interests in not being viewed as litigious, but the cases that have become public 
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demonstrate the difficulty of determining who has rights to slides, unique reagents, genetically 
altered specimens, and the like.226  When raised in an EEA prosecution, these decisions could 
have life-altering consequences.227  
The EEA could, in short, make American universities unattractive to students, post docs, 
visiting faculty, and other potential foreign collaborators.  The recent arrests of three faculty 
members of China’s Tianjin University highlights these risks. In the Chinese media reports of 
their arrests, Tianjin University officials stated that “the United States had done harm to 
academic exchanges by ‘politicizing’ a scientific dispute.”228 
 
There could also be unfortunate selection effects.  Under a view of national security that 
seeks to preserve U.S. dominance, visitors from emerging countries, such as China and Russia, 
are likely to be the primary focus of investigations.  But because these economies are so 
dynamic, these are the people with whom U.S. academics are probably most interested in 
collaborating.  Furthermore, the premier universities in many countries are government-
supported.  Because exclusive ownership by the government is not necessary to consider an 
entity a foreign government, prosecution in these cases could be for economic espionage rather 
than theft. 229  Leading foreign faculty could, therefore, face especially stiff penalties.  The 
National Academies has been concerned that export controls will hobble world class scientists 
from coming to the United States, drive knowledge-intensive jobs abroad, and accelerate the 
development of foreign research centers;230 paradoxically, the same can easily be said of an EEA 
administered with the goal of protecting U.S. technological leadership as a national security 
interest. 
 
b. Job Mobility, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation 
 
Most of the current charges under the Economic Espionage Act involve the scenario 
captured in The Company Man, where an employee—a lowly engineer, strapped for money and 
unable to send his child to the Ivy League college, is considered the weak link in the private 
company.231  When this prototypical American worker is approached by a headhunter who offers 
him more for his talent, he naively considers it instead of immediately realizing that it must be a 
scam.  When he finally “does the right thing” and goes to his boss to report on such preying, he 
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is not offered a raise or promotion to match the (fake) outside offer.  Rather, he is rewarded with 
the pat on the back for not falling for the predatory offer and he is asked to cooperate with the 
FBI in a sting operation (perhaps for comedic effect, or perhaps to convey how difficult it is for a 
“civilian” to do the right thing, the film shows the FBI agents watching the engineer from the 
nearby hotel room during the sting operation and mocking him amongst themselves for almost 
getting sick from the fear of having to pose as a mole in order to capture the Chinese).  The 
movie’s dramatic climax centers on the ability of the frail employee to stay strong until the FBI 
bursts into the room to arrest the foreign offenders.    
 
But not all employees are heroes and many find themselves at the receiving end of trade 
secrecy litigation.  In civil cases involving trade secrets law in state courts the vast majority of 
the cases (over 90 percent)  involve either a current or former employee or a business partner.232  
A similar pattern is emerging in criminal prosecutions involving the EEA.  According to Toren’s 
analysis, in more than 90 percent of the EEA prosecutions, the defendant was an “insider,” and 
had access to the trade secret because he was an employee of the victim, or worked for a vendor 
or contractor of the victim. 233  In many of the cases the defendant committed the theft shortly 
before leaving the victim company. In a 2000 Congressional hearing of the Subcommittee on 
International Economic Policy and Trade about enhancing laws against economic espionage, the 
chairman of the subcommittee opening statement explained the threat posed by employees: 
 
[I]ndustrial espionage is a crime which continues to be best accomplished through low 
tech means and is not necessarily dependent upon high tech gadgetry. A vast majority of 
corporate espionage crimes do not occur in cyberspace, but rather in person, face to face. 
For example, key employees within a given corporation might be sought by a rival 
company for information or recruited by spies posing as consultants or headhunters at 
trade shows.234 
 
In general, intellectual property shapes competition and the flow of knowledge and 
people within industries and regions. Trade secrets in particular, because of their pervasiveness 
and their self-defining quality as encompassing whatever the company keeps confidential, affect 
the movement and behavior of employees.  Therefore, while trade secret law is understood as a 
branch of intellectual property law, designed to draw boundaries around valuable proprietary 
information,235 it should equally be understood as a system that regulates the relationship 
between firms and employees.236  Quite straightforwardly, it is easy to see why increased trade 
secret protection operates to decrease employee mobility.  In a legal regime of heightened trade 
secret liability, employees have more to lose when they choose to leave an employer. Prospective 
employers too are more at risk in such a regime. Beyond this direct effect on job recruitment, the 
key question for policy is how such a regime impacts innovation. 
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An impressive body of recent economic research considers the costs and benefits of job 
mobility, entrepreneurship and knowledge flows for industries and regions.  Overwhelmingly, 
the research on innovation shows the invaluable role of connectivity, knowledge networks, and 
exchanges for a region’s economic health and innovation capacities.237  Recent empirical studies 
in innovation consistently find that mobility and flow are correlated with higher levels 
entrepreneurship and economic growth.238  When individuals are allowed to move within an 
industry, they are able to deploy their skills and experience more effectively, and they are more 
motivated to perform well and grow professionally.  Thus, recent behavioral research suggests 
that employees who are stripped of ownership over the knowledge and skills they gain during 
employment are discouraged from investing in their human capital.239  Again, this effect is not 
hard to comprehend: when employees understand that the knowledge and skill that they gain at a 
workplace is entirely proprietary and blocked from future use during the span of their career, 
they are less likely to be invested in gaining and building upon that knowledge. 
Mobility has other important effects on technological progress. In mobile markets, 
knowledge networks are denser and the benefits of spillovers are spread not only to the receiving 
companies, but—counterintuitively—also to the “sending” companies, those who lose their 
employees to the competition.240  The latter happens in several related ways. First, the company 
whose former employee moves to a related firm in the industry expands its company footprint by 
having denser connections, and a web of former employees in professional associations, 
technical committees, and lobbying efforts.  This makes it easier for the “sending firm” to 
navigate the market. Second, firms are increasingly using their “alums” in similar ways as 
universities draw on their alumni: for recruitment purposes.241  When potential hires know 
someone who used to work at a given company they are more likely to apply and to be interested 
in an opening at the firm.  Former employees can be key goodwill ambassadors who enhance the 
firm’s reputation.  
Third and perhaps most important for innovation, when employees move from one 
company to another, both firms gain knowledge from these flows. In one study, a team of 
researchers from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of 
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Maryland studied the effects of “outbound mobility” on citation patterns in patent 
applications.242 The study examined 154 semiconductor firms over 15 years and the linkages 
between the firms on both sides of an employee move. The study found that after an employee 
changed jobs, both the “sending” and the “receiving” firms become more likely to cite the other 
firm’s patents. That is, even companies that lost employees gained knowledge and access to the 
receiving firm’s endeavors. The researchers suggest that the employees who remain in the 
sending firm benefit from information generated at their former colleague’s new workplace by 
continued professional contact and through increased attention and awareness to the innovation 
activities of the receiving company, leading to cross-pollination. The effect was more 
pronounced when there was a large geographic distance between the two companies.  This 
suggests that the farther an employee moves, for example, if a foreign-born employee returns to 
a home country to work at a rival firm there, the more significantly his or her former employer 
can benefit.  The transfer creates a bridge between the firms and allows the employees of both 
firms to encounter intellectual capital that, as a practical matter, may otherwise have been 
unavailable to them. 
Indeed, in sharp contrast to the traditional economic model, which posits that the more a 
firm is able to prevent exposure of their information, the more it will invest in research, recent 
empirical findings suggest that companies increase their investment in research and development 
when turnover is higher.243  In this view, the research outputs of competing firms should, at least 
in some industries, be characterized as complementarities.  Because innovation is cumulative in 
its nature, as knowledge flows throughout the industry, the entire industry, including those firms 
which experience the negative externalities of losing valuable knowledge to other firms in the 
field, moves more rapidly and increases its research outputs.244  Building on these insights, the 
study of knowledge spillovers rejects a simplistic free-rider analysis and suggests that spillovers 
are increasing the equilibrium of R&D investment.245  Industry, as well as regional, growth is 
endogenous; rather than a simplified win-lose dynamic, competition propels an upward cycle.246   
 
Importantly, regions that encourage human capital mobility are also able to attract more 
human capital from other regions.247  Conversely, regions that are too controlling of their human 
capital flow experience over time a brain drain effect, a movement away from the region by 
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some of its most valuable talent.248 Studies have documented the significance of foreign talent to 
the building of high tech regions, primarily Silicon Valley.249  Historically, studies of innovation 
have consistently shown that traveling and foreign-born inventors significantly over-represented 
among the great inventors.250  Most broadly, the research suggests that high employee turnover, 
regional human capital concentration, and density of professional networks all contribute to 
economic growth.251  Putting the research on individuals and firms together, the interrelated 
effects suggest that at some point, too many constraints on the flow knowledge and penalties on 
its use, especially when criminal sanctions are involved, can significantly reduce incentives to 
innovate.  
 
The intensity of EEA prosecutions is particularly problematic from the viewpoint of job 
mobility and market competition.  Even when the stakes merely involve civil trade secret 
litigation, disputes with former employers can have grave consequences. Litigation in these 
contexts is often used as a strategy to deter competition.  As Graves and Diboise note, “courts do 
not recognize that plaintiff's trade secret claims are too often created after the fact by attorneys to 
try to trap a former employee, and not so valuable that the plaintiff had previously recorded them 
as company intellectual property and guarded them as secret before the employee departed.”252 
In other words, broad trade secret protections can have lock-in effects on workers. Employees 
are more likely to avoid jobs in their field of expertise than risk civil liability. When the stakes 
involve the possibility of criminal liability, such avoidance is all the more likely. And it is not 
only the defendants who are affected.  Increased trade secrecy litigation against former 
employees also means that other employees, co-workers who have witnessed such disputes, are 
discouraged from pursuing professional opportunities.253  Indeed in some cases, litigation against 
a former employee turned competitor is primarily meant to send a warning signal to all 
employees in the firm.  As Rosemary Ziedonis and her coauthors put it, “even if the costs of 
being litigious in a particular dispute outweigh the benefits, the deterrence of future knowledge 
spillovers can justify the investment.”254  
 
Entrepreneurship is at particular risk. Employees are far more likely to pursue 
entrepreneurial activities the greater their professional ties, yet as we saw, trade secrecy litigation 
can reduce the density of relationships.255  Moreover, while large incumbent firms can 
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sometimes mitigate the risk of prosecution by erecting walls,256 so that a new employee is 
segregated from those working on projects that compete with a former employer, that strategy is 
not practical—or absolutely impossible—for start-ups, which may have few workers and only 
one major project.  In addition, incumbents with large resources are better situated to offer their 
employees indemnification to protect them from legal liability, to defend against trade secret 
litigation. As we saw, they can also use their superior resources to drive out competition.257  
Start-ups have none of these advantages.  Finally, the threat of litigation can dry up the venture 
capital investment start-ups need to develop their products, launch them, and become 
successful.258  
 
Exacerbating the problem is the expansion of the EEA to cover “all forms and types of 
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, 
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and 
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically.”259  Particularly when the subject matter involves complex technical 
information, prosecutors and courts likely defer to companies’ self-definition of proprietary 
information and companies have expanded the subject-matter of proprietary information to 
include virtually everything.260  Evidently, then, any type of information can now qualify as 
confidential. As a result, former employees may face charges at almost any turn if they chose to 
continue in their field of their expertise and compete with their former employer.  
 
 Employers recruiting new talent are also at risk. The EEA defines as a criminal not only 
the individual who takes the trade secrets but also third parties, namely competitors, anyone who 
“receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or 
appropriated, obtained, or converted …”.261  The perverse result is that employers are most at 
risk to be in violation of the EEA when they logically choose to hire the most experienced 
employees—people who have already worked in the industry and gained invaluable training.262  
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The bottom line is that, today, hiring employees away from competitors inevitably entails a 
threat of criminal sanctions. With reduced willingness to hire experienced knowledge workers 
comes a significant decrease in knowledge flows across firms, reduced employment 
opportunities, and a dampened desire to enter the technology sector.  
 
IV.  Reconciling Legitimate Interests 
 
None of this is to say that the FBI—or the government more generally—should not be 
concerned about cyberterrorism or even about international trade secrecy violations.  We do not 
advocate abolishing the EEA.  We do, however, recommend several changes in the trade secrecy 
regime. 
 
Clearly, it would be helpful to amend the EEA to expressly incorporate many of the 
limits that cabin tort actions and ensure that knowledge workers can enter into fruitful exchanges 
and employees retain the ability to move between jobs.  The statute should make clear that 
subjective intent is not enough and that the victim’s characterization of information as 
proprietary is not controlling.  The information taken must, from a rational perspective, be a 
trade secret whose unauthorized taking could harm its owner.263  The other elements—what 
counts as an unauthorized taking, the degree to which information can retain its status as a secret 
despite the industry’s knowledge of it, the kinds of harm that are actionable—should also be 
defined more precisely.  In addition, thought might be given to delineating the kinds of 
information that are protectable through the criminal law.  Trade secrecy theft should be 
carefully distinguished from cyberhacking.  Both can be accomplished electronically, but 
hacking is designed to destroy infrastructure important to all aspects of public life; it has very 
different social impact from theft in the private realm.  Similarly, the law would benefit from the 
classification system used in the NSD-189 context: the taking of military or dual-use information 
is categorically different from the code Goldman Sachs uses when it gains an edge in the stock 
market through high-frequency trading; arguably, criminal prosecution should be limited to the 
cases involving the strongest national interests. 
 
It is particularly important to clarify the acts that are sufficient to give rise to charges of 
attempt or conspiracy.  Within the creative industries, there are many acts that are common yet, 
in retrospect, can be made to look suspicious.  After all, programmers routinely keep copies of 
files they worked on, store information on servers in unknown locations,264 or use one another’s 
passwords;265 similar activities go on in other professional settings (including law firms). And as 
we saw, the government even regards some very conventional academic events (conferences, 
meetings with foreigners, travelling back and forth between your home country and country of 
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residence) as suspicious.  It is certainly easy to understand the need to preserve the government’s 
ability to mount sting operations that involve the passage of fake secrets (as occurred in The 
Company Man).  But because attempt and conspiracy charges have no analogue in civil trade 
secrecy law, there is an especial need to be clear that not every suspicious act can constitute the 
basis for these offenses.  To date, the EEA has not been successfully challenged as void for 
vagueness.266  However, judging from the aggressive positions taken in the IP Crimes Manual, 
the statute fails to provide adequate notice of what the government considers a crime.   
 
Much the same can be said of the provision extending the EEA extraterritorially 
whenever “an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.”267  In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has been skittish about extending U.S. law too broadly as the 
imposition of American law can interfere with the sovereign authority of other countries and 
disrupt international relations.268   Superficially, the EEA fulfills the Court’s requirement that 
Congress express the view that the law apply to foreign activity.  Congress may not, however, 
realize the sorts of activities the government regards as suspicious.  Clarification would therefore 
be useful from both a local and international perspective. 
 
In addition to focusing on the EEA itself, there is need to consider the cumulative effect 
of government responses to the threat of trade secrecy misappropriation.  The double prosecution 
of Aleynikov, including the New York prosecutor’s use of concepts developed in the federal 
case,269 raises questions about the relationship between the federal and state attorneys.  Given 
that the Second Circuit took the unusual step of reversing Aleynikov’s conviction and ordering 
him acquitted and released immediately,270 the rapidity of the second indictment less than 6 
months later had vindictive overtones that raises conspiracy theories of its own.  The impending 
federal civil law is also problematic.  Because it is not meant to preempt state law, a federal right 
of action would introduce yet another layer of protection and expose the technological 
community to the possibility of four separate lawsuits over the same activity. As others have 
noted, the result will be greater uncertainly, less mobility, and an even greater chill on creative 
production.271  
 
But rethinking enforcement is not enough.  It is equally crucial to reconsider the rhetoric 
equating trade secrecy with national security. The climate generated by an approach that seeks to 
staunch the flow of information is not in the long term national security interest of the United 
States.  Vigorous enforcement of the EEA may protect the current technological position of the 
United States (in that indirect sense, it is perhaps a national security issue, just as is any national 
economic policy).  However,  it also handicaps the nation’s ability to foster creative communities 
that can continue to engage in sophisticated, imaginative research at the highest technological 
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levels.   Local incumbents may thus retain their positions for longer, but a system that 
discourages academic research, start-ups, global talent recruitment, and job mobility is not one 
that will perpetuate the dominance of U.S. innovation in the global economy.   
   
The national security trope also undermines intellectual property values.  In particular, it 
ignores a core principal of all intellectual property regimes: that protection is intended only to 
allow innovators to recoup their investment and earn enough profit to encourage more 
innovation. Exclusivity is not meant to be permanent; it is not a goal in itself but rather a means 
for producing dynamic efficiency.  Copyright and patent laws protect innovators from free riders 
only for specified periods of time, after which the protected advances fall into the public domain, 
where they can be freely used and improved upon. The trade secrecy regime has no counterpart 
to a specific term of years.  Instead, it relies on leakage—reverse engineering and independent 
invention to be sure, but also leakage through interactions within the creative sector. Unless 
those enforcing the EEA understand the potential impact of reducing this leakage, enforcement 
will destroy an important accommodation between proprietary and access interests.  Knowing 
their trade secrets will be vigorously enforced courtesy of the government could also alter the 
choice innovators make between trade secrecy and patent protection.  In a worst case scenario, it 
may lead inventors to alter their research agendas so that the advances they discover can be kept 
in a domain where others can never benefit from them.272   
  
It is also worth considering the effect of specific claims that support the new rhetoric.  As 
the Chen case suggests, not all foreigners, or even all foreigners who return to their birthplace for 
visits, are intent on stealing the fruits of American ingenuity. That mindset represents racial 
profiling at its most pernicious.273  It also produces spectacular prosecutorial errors, including 
investigations and indictments that fall apart, but nonetheless do significant damage to the people 
involved.274  Furthermore, the rhetoric injures the innovation environment.  There is a deep 
literature on the Not-Invented-Here syndrome, which shows that firms willing to collaborate and 
transact with others are more successful and produce more impactful inventions than firms that 
reject advances that are not invented internally.275  It is ironic (if not tragic) that just as U.S. 
industry has largely shaken off this syndrome, the EEA not only invigorates it, but also 
transposes it into a geographical realm, so that it is no longer possible to  accept inputs from 
scientists who were not born in the United States.   
 
Similarly, there are significant questions about the extent of that $ 400 billion—the figure 
The Company Man mentions as the loss U.S. industry is experiencing each year.  It is clearly 
                                                 
272 Nor can the government regulate them for safety, environment, or health concerns, see, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, 
Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 465 (2007). 
273 To some extent, rethinking has begun, see note 191 supra.  
274 See, e.g., Joyce Xi, To Get My Father, Xiaoxing Xi, FBI Twisted America's Ideals, USA Today, Sept. 20, 2015, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/09/18/xiaoxing-xi-china-spy-fbi-state-visit-
column/32560009/ (describing the problems that the failed prosecution of Xiaoxing Xi inflicted on the author’s 
family). 
275 See, e.g., Ajay Agrawal, Iain Cockburn, Carlos Rosell, Not Invented Here? Innovation in Company Towns, 67 
Journal of Urban Economics 78 (2010); Ralph Katz and Thomas J. Allen, Investigating the Not Invented Here (NIH) 
Syndrome: A Look at the Performance, Tenure, and Communication Patterns of 50 R & D Project Groups, 12 R&D 
Management 7 (1982). 
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wrong to measure it by looking at the cost to development.  As we argued above, a significant 
part of public funding is intended to produce public knowledge.  Utilizing the advances made 
possible with NSF funding is not theft if the NSF intended the recipient researchers to publish 
what they learned.  Furthermore, not all investment in development results in inventions or in 
commercializable products.  Nor should loss be evaluated according to the price the inventor 
wishes to charge customers.  The use the United States makes of that measure have been rejected 
in international disputes for the very good reason that it ignores the demand function—that is, 
whether those who could use the product productively will actually buy it at the manufacturer’s 
suggested retail price.276  Apart from international concerns with this calculation, there are 
several domestic contexts in which a more realistic approach to damages is being taken, 
including in awarding damages in patent case,277 sentencing while collar criminals,278 and 
imposing punitive damages, and punitive damages.279  The current rhetoric of trade secrecy flies 
in the face of these trends.  Besides, even if there are significant costs associated with theft, the 
ambiguous effect of the law suggests that the costs of enforcement and the social benefit of 
spillovers should also be considered in determining the net effect of theft of economic welfare. 
 
 Equating trade secrecy protection with national security also works at cross purposes 
with other government initiatives.  As Burstein showed, enhancing industry’s ability to enforce 
trade secrets that are lost undermines private firms’ incentives to protect their technologies 
themselves.  The prosecution of employees who wish to found their own firms280 runs counter to 
the attention to the U.S. Small Business Administration lavishes on encouraging start-ups,281 
which it views as a core component of national innovation strategy.282 The chill imposed on 
leaving a firm to start a new one also interferes with the goals of the 2012 JOBS Act,283 which 
                                                 
276 See Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009)(adopting a measure based on the prices at which customers bought unauthorized 
copies).  In agreements subsequent to TRIPS, however, the United States has managed to insert its view, see, e.g,, 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, arts. 23(1) & 9(1), Dec. 3, 2010, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 
243 (2011) (nothing that “commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage” are 
included and that and the calculation of loss is to be based on “any legitimate measure of value the right holder 
submits, which may include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, 
or the suggested retail price”).  
277 See, e.g., Lucent Technologies Inc., v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (2009). 
278 See, e.g., Note, Derick R. Vollrath, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in 
White-Collar Criminal Cases, 58 Duke L. J. 1001, 1018-1020 (2010). 
279 See, e.g., Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages: Clarity, 
Consistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 Hastings L.J. 1257 (2015). 
280 An example of the first situation, using proprietary information to start solo-venture is in United States v. 
Newman United States v. Newman, Docket No. 1:14-cr-00704 (N.D. Ill. Dec 04, 2014) where the indictment alleges 
that a stock trader for “Trader Firm” accessed and copied more than 400,000 computer files onto a thumb drive 
(information including algorithms, source code, and executable files). The same month, February 2014, Newman 
created his own company, “NTF LLC” which signed an agreement with CME online trading platforms. In March 
2014, Newman resigned from Trading Firm and established a trading account for NTF LLC. The indictment alleges 
that Newman stole various trade secrets from Trading Firm, which he then used to support his solo venture. 
Specifically the indictment notes a “proprietary computer file used for pricing commodity futures contracts.” As of 
April 29, 2015, this action is pending in the Northern District of Illinois. 
281 See, e.g., SBA, Startup in a Day, available at https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-initiatives/startup-day (noting 
actions to reduce the effort requires to start a firm). 
282 See, e.g., SBA, Start Up America, available at https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-initiatives/startup-
america/about-startup-america. 
283 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116, § 301, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
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sees start-ups as an important part of a strategy to increase employment.  Recent changes in 
patent law have analogously reflected the importance of encouraging small businesses to become 
entrepreneurial.284 
 
Paradoxically, the same industries that decry the loss of secrets to foreign countries are 
simultaneously concerned about a talent drought—a shortage that the Small Business 
Administration claims “could endanger U.S. competiveness as Canada, Germany, South 
Africa and China attempt to woo engineers from abroad too.”285  Worried about the venture 
investments that Chinese companies have made in entrepreneurs around the world, and that the 
Silicon Dragon will pose a serious threat to Silicon Valley, these industries have lobbied for the 
2015 Immigration Innovation Act, a bill which increases the cap on H-1B is designed to help the 
tech industry address this talent shortage.286  But aggressive prosecution of foreign nationals cuts 
directly against such attempts to win the global brain drain battles.  
 
Consider also the Fulbright Program.  It was initiated in 1946 by Senator J. William 
Fulbright to strengthen the basis for peace by promoting mutual understanding between the 
people of the United States and the peoples of partner countries around the world. The Fulbright 
fellowship is the US Government’s flagship academic exchange program.  It operates in more 
than 155 countries.  Each year, it grants approximately 4,000 foreign students scholarships and 
awards travel funds to almost 2,000 American academics.287  A central requirement attached to a 
foreign receipt of a Fulbright fellowship is to return to one’s home country for at least two years 
after studying in the United States in order to impart the wisdom learned here abroad.  At the 
same time, however, the extensive publicity given to EEA cases involving academics, such as 
the charges against Beijing academics at Tianjin University, conveys the opposite message: do 
not expect to return to your country with knowledge you gathered.  It is sure to discourage 
foreigners from visiting, studying—or, eventually, working in the United States and contributing 




In many ways, reframing trade secrecy theft as a national security issue is 
understandable.  Cyberwarfare is clearly increasing and the FBI needs all the help it can get in 
identifying hackers and other high tech terrorists.  Furthermore, there is plenty of secret 
information with critical military uses; protecting that matériel is certainly in the nation’s best 
interest.  However, the rhetoric surrounding economic espionage goes well beyond these well-
                                                 
284 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) & 37 C.F.R 1.27-1.29 (fee reductions for microentities and other small entities); 35 
U.S.C. § 273(recognizing prior user rights to protect nonpatentees who are first users).  
285 Katie Benner, Obama, Immigration and Silicon Valley, Bloomberg View (Jan 22, 2015), available at 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-22/obama-immigration-reform-h-b1-visas-and-silicon-valley  
286 Mark R. Warner,  Sens. Warner & Kaine Introduce Bipartisan Startup Act (Jan. 16 2015), available at 
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=75c06654-ae4c-4d39-b9bd-
b8bf3bbc399e.  
287 See Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, The Fulbright Program, Facts and Common 
Questions, available at http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/facts-and-common-questions.  
288 Chun Han Wong, Economic Espionage Charges Could Further Dent China-U.S. Ties, The Wall Street Journal, 





recognized arenas.  It would extend protection to technology that is not clearly secret (as in the 
Liu and Jin cases) or valuable (as with Aleynikov), and that is only of private concern (as with 
many of the technologies mentioned in the government reports).  It throws suspicion on 
collaboration, joint ventures, academic exchanges, establishing new companies, and switching 
jobs.  
 
Without prosecutorial sensitivity to intellectual property values, along with a more 
nuanced view of the contributions foreign innovators make to domestic inventiveness, creative 
development will suffer.  Not only will the country fall behind globally, it will be harder to 
produce the advances necessary to address new threats, many of them inherently global—climate 
change and pollution; Ebola and other new diseases; resistance to antibiotics.  In the name of 
preserving U.S. technological dominance, overblown trade secrecy law can deter the very 
conduct that would, in fact, maintain the United States’ leadership in the innovation sector. 
 
To be sure, there is a trade-off here.  While greater openness and more vigorous 
opportunities to share information and learn from others would lead to more technological 
progress, they could also expose valuable information.  But even from a pure security angle, the 
zealous approach to trade secrecy is problematic. This approach undermines the dynamic goals 
of intellectual property law to promote future innovation.  It contradicts the view of the United 
States as a benign world leader, helping countries reach development, democratization, through 
education and progress, trade, investment and aid.  It ignores the United States’ own history of 
progress and prosperity, which, as historian Doron Ben-Atar has, shown, was heavily dependent 
on the misappropriation of trade secrets from the Old World.  It is, as Ben-Atar concluded, 
“impossible to contain the abuse of technology without undermining the free flow of knowledge 
that is the prerequisite for innovation.”289  It has always been the case that we understood 
innovation and global economic development as the key to security and world peace.  Terrorism 
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